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WHY ARREST?
Rachel A. Harmon*
Arrests are the paradigmatic police activity. Though the practice of arrests in
the United States, especially arrests involving minority suspects, is under at-
tack, even critics widely assume the power to arrest is essential to policing. As
a result, neither commentators nor scholars have asked why police need to
make arrests. This Article takes up that question, and it argues that the power
to arrest and the use of that power should be curtailed. The twelve million
arrests police conduct each year are harmful not only to the individual ar-
rested but also to their families and communities and to society as a whole.
Given their costs, arrests should be used only when they serve an important
state interest; yet, they often happen even when no such interest exists. Gov-
ernments have allowed constitutional law to become the primary constraint
on arrest practices, and it has proved a poor proxy for good policy analysis.
The Fourth Amendment permits arrests whenever an officer has probable
cause: it has no mechanism for ensuring that the state has any interest in
making an arrest—as opposed to starting the criminal process in another way.
More broadly, traditional arguments for arrests cannot justify existing arrest
practice. Arrests are usually unnecessary to start the criminal process effec-
tively, to maintain order, to collect evidence, or to deter crime. In most cases,
reasonable, less intrusive, alternative means exist or could exist for achieving
these ends. Even arrests for some serious crimes might be curbed significantly
without risking substantial harm to public safety or order. If the state can
achieve its law enforcement objectives without arrests, then police departments
should conduct far fewer arrests than they currently do, and states should
restrict the statutory authority to arrest accordingly. Though there are risks to
reducing arrests, those risks are far less problematic than continuing what is
presently a massive, and largely unnecessary, enterprise of state coercion.
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Introduction
“You are under arrest.”
Perhaps no words stand more for what it means to be a police officer
than these. There is a reason for this preeminence. It is no exaggeration to
say that handcuffing a suspect and taking him to jail is the paradigmatic
police activity. Police make arrests to start most criminal prosecutions, to
take control of dangerous people, and to solve problems on the street. Ar-
rests are so central to our way of thinking about law enforcement that we
often measure the success of policing by the number of arrests officers make.
It is an axiom of criminal justice policy that law enforcement requires
arrests.
If you want to see just how strong this assumption is, consider that,
although arrests are at the heart of today’s most contentious critiques of
criminal justice, critics almost never suggest that the power to arrest is part
of the problem. When law enforcement detractors protest that police prac-
tices are abusive and discriminatory, they are frequently talking about ar-
rests. When critics argue that we incarcerate far too many people for far too
long and then continue to punish them after they are free, they view arrest
as an important step towards incarceration and the use of arrest records as
part of the extended punishment. And when they contend that the killings
by law enforcement of Michael Brown, Walter Scott, Tamir Rice, Eric Gar-
ner, Freddie Gray, and Samuel Dubose represent a racist violence so extreme
that it is analogous to lynching, they are often speaking of force used during
arrests. To address these problems, commentators attack the judgment exer-
cised in individual arrests, and they advocate reforms such as eliminating
some low-level crimes, lowering sentences, discouraging racial disparities in
policing, collecting more data, and prosecuting police officers more often.
But they do not question police authority to make an arrest when a crime
occurs. Like almost everyone else, even bitter critics of American criminal
justice accept that arrests are generally essential to ensuring public safety and
order, and that the police power to arrest is therefore largely inviolable.
This Article considers whether the axiom is true. Do police need to ar-
rest? In a liberal society, government coercion that intrudes upon individual
freedom must be justified. To be legitimate, our practice of arrest should be
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at least plausibly necessary to achieve important public aims, the costs of
arrests should be broadly proportionate to the ends they serve, and the
harms of arrests should be distributed fairly.1 Yet, right now, generous law
enforcement authority to arrest exists, largely unexamined. Perhaps because
constitutional doctrine purports to regulate each arrest, we take the power to
arrest for granted. If anything, when we consider arrests, we tend to assume
that arrests are not too costly, at least for most crimes, because they are so
briefly intrusive and because—even if not every arrest is legitimate—arrests
are critical to law enforcement goals.
I argue that these assumptions are flawed. First, arrests are more harm-
ful than they seem, not only to the individuals arrested but also to their
families and communities and to society as a whole. Second, the law we use
to evaluate arrests cannot fairly weigh these harms. The Constitution’s re-
strictions on the state’s power to arrest have limited bearing on whether
individual arrests are worthwhile and much less bearing on whether the pre-
sent heavy reliance on arrest as a tool of policing is legitimate. And third,
our traditional justifications for arrests—starting the criminal process and
maintaining public order—at best support far fewer arrests than we cur-
rently permit.
In Part I, I provide a working definition of an arrest, a term which has
no standard definition in the law. Under this definition, an arrest occurs
when an officer takes a suspect into custody, transports him to a police
facility, takes identifying information, creates a record of the arrest, and de-
tains the suspect until release or judicial review. I then review the costs of
legal arrests for suspects, families, officers, and municipalities. In Part II, I
contend that Fourth Amendment law does not ensure that arrests are im-
posed only when these costs are worth bearing or normatively justified. In
developing its Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court takes for
granted that the government has a strong interest in arresting those sus-
pected of crimes, and it weighs this interest heavily in evaluating arrests.
Moreover, the Court’s Fourth Amendment rules often allow arrests (and the
serious intrusions that accompany them) for reasons internal to constitu-
tional doctrine rather than because the arrests reflect an adequate balance
between individual and societal interests. In Part III, I consider the state
interests in arrests and find that they are not as strong as they are commonly
imagined to be. Arrests are usually unnecessary to start the criminal process
because alternative—and less harmful—legal mechanisms can largely iden-
tify defendants and ensure they appear in court. Similarly, arrests are not
essential either to defuse most ongoing disorder or to collect evidence or to
1. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 870, 873–74 (2015) [hereinafter Harmon, Federal Programs] (“[I]nvasions of privacy,
autonomy, liberty, and bodily integrity by the police should . . . be measured both by whether
they serve a legitimate state end and whether they are proportionate to that end.”). Fairness
means both that the person is selected for arrest for a good, individualized reason, such as
because there is evidence of criminal offending and a risk of nonappearance, and also that he
is not also selected for a bad reason, such as his race, ethnicity, sex, or religion, though there
can be debate about what constitutes a good or bad reason.
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fight crime because police have, or could adopt, less intrusive alternative
means of achieving the same ends. I conclude that, given that arrests are
extremely costly and often unnecessary, we should consider significant re-
forms to reduce police reliance on arrests as a commonplace law enforce-
ment tool, including reducing police authority to arrest.
In the United States, we arrest something like twelve million people a
year, adding up to more than 250 million arrests over the past twenty years.2
Even this initial look at why we arrest suggests that our existing practice is
indefensible.
I. The Consequences of Arrests
A. What an Arrest Is
There is no standard definition of an arrest and no shared nomenclature
for the various police practices that start the criminal process and deprive
people of their freedom. Court decisions and statutes sometimes apply the
term to simply handcuffing a suspect or issuing a traffic ticket, but in other
instances exclude charging a suspect and hauling him off to jail if he is soon
let go. Moreover, definitions of arrests are frequently instrumental and un-
stable.3 Courts define arrests differently when distinguishing them from
Terry stops, when evaluating a wrongful arrest claim, and when considering
whether evidence stemmed from a legitimate search incident to arrest.4
2. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the
United States, 2014, at 2 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2014/persons-arrested/arrestmain.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9TD-55JA]; Fed. Bureau of Inves-
tigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United States, 2012, at 1 (2012), https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/arrestmain.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8AF-48M7]; Howard N. Snyder, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Arrest
in the United States, 1980–2009, at 16 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
aus8009.pdf [https://perma.cc/F438-JX76]. This and other federal data may overestimate the
number of arrests. Federal statistics rely on the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program.
Reporting instructions for the UCR Program tell agencies to report as arrests “all persons
processed by arrest, citation, or summons,” an instruction that would appear to include some
charged without a traditional custodial arrest. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Reporting Handbook 98 (2004), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/handbook/ucr-
handbook04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TUV-4BX7]. The instructions then confusingly suggest
that reporting refers only to arrests, that is, “the number of persons taken into custody.” Id.
Developing an accurate accounting of the number of arrests versus the number of criminal
summonses and citations requires clearer instructions and more granularity in the data
provided.
3. For the change in arrest definitions over time, compare the pre-Terry case, Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959) (“When the officers interrupted the two men and re-
stricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete.”), with
the post-Terry decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433-35, 39 (1984) (distinguish-
ing between a routine traffic stop, including roadside detention and questioning of a suspect,
and a “formal arrest”).
4. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 129 (2003) (discussing varying constitutional definitions of
arrests and collecting cases).
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This paper evaluates contemporary arrest practice by examining the ef-
fects of arrests on individuals and government interests. Towards that end, it
adopts a functional definition of arrests, one that focuses on what arrests do.
In this view, the key components of an arrest are a significant deprivation of
liberty, some formal step toward criminal prosecution, and getting
“booked.” More specifically, the police arrest a suspect whenever they, on
the basis of suspicion that he has committed a criminal offense or violation,
(1) take him into custody by handcuffing or otherwise depriving him of his
freedom; (2) transport him to a police station, jail, or detention facility; (3)
process him by creating a permanent record of the arrest, taking identifying
information, including photographs, fingerprints, and the like; and (4) de-
tain him until either he is released or his arrest is subjected to judicial
review.
The first of these criteria—custody—limits the concept of arrests to im-
mediately coercive government activities. This distinguishes arrests from
noncustodial means of commanding a suspect to appear to answer criminal
charges. Criminal summonses and citations, for example, require suspects to
bring themselves before a court at a fixed time. Some citations, usually traf-
fic tickets, also permit defendants to choose between appearing to contest a
charge and conceding guilt by mail. Although all of these are sometimes
labelled “arrests” by courts or legislatures, none involve the traditional kind
or scope of intrusion experienced by those taken into custody.
The second criterion—conveyance to a law enforcement facility—dis-
tinguishes arrests from lesser police detentions. This approach is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s constitutional criminal procedure cases, which
distinguish between “full custodial” or “formal” arrests and other seizures.5
For example, Fourth Amendment law treats seizures that exceed the degree
of intrusion permitted in a brief Terry stop like arrests in that they must be
justified by probable cause.6 But only “formal” or “custodial” arrests, and
not extended stops that result in citations, put suspects in close and ex-
tended proximity to officers, and therefore justify “search[es] incident to
arrest.”7 In this way, the Court separates arrests (on one hand), from traffic
5. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (distinguishing
between an arrest and a seizure for a traffic violation); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 (distinguish-
ing between formal arrest and a traffic or Terry stop); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294
(1973) (distinguishing between formal arrest and a seizure implicating the Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (distinguishing between full-cus-
tody and lesser seizures not justifying a search incident to arrest).
6. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979) (“[Although] these intru-
sions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest. . . . [t]he application of
the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an in-
trusion of this magnitude is termed an ‘arrest’ under state law. The mere facts that petitioner
was not told he was under arrest, was not ‘booked,’ and would not have had an arrest record if
the interrogation had proved fruitless, while not insignificant for all purposes, obviously do
not make petitioner’s seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions in-
volved in Terry and its progeny.” (citations omitted)).
7. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1998).
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stops, Terry stops, and other seizures (on the other), which may require legal
justification, even probable cause, but do not constitute an arrest.8
The third criterion—booking—highlights another consequential com-
ponent of arrests. During an arrest, after a person is handcuffed and trans-
ported to a police station, he and his belongings are searched thoroughly,
and an officer “books” the suspect by taking information and creating a
permanent record in the department’s files. In this way, arrests are different
both from what happens to those detained on the street without an arrest
and those transported to a station house by a police officer for another pur-
pose, such as an interview. While precise procedures for booking vary, the
officer will inevitably record the crime of arrest, as well as identifying infor-
mation about the suspect, including the person’s name, address, date of
birth, height, weight, eye, and hair color.9 Suspects may also be photo-
graphed and fingerprinted, and have their DNA collected.10 The fact of the
arrest, the charges, and information about the suspect are entered into com-
puterized databases with national links, and therefore are available far be-
yond the arresting agency. Unlike many other encounters with the police, a
suspect who is arrested and booked faces practical, reputational, and privacy
consequences that persist whether or not he is subject to further legal
proceedings.
Some jurisdictions carry out what might be called “quick-release ar-
rests,” in which defendants are transported to jail and booked, appear before
a police official, and then are released, all within a few hours. Though they
are frequently not labelled arrests by the jurisdictions that carry them out,
and they are less costly for suspects than traditional arrests, quick-release
arrests, including desk appearance tickets11 and stationhouse releases, never-
theless share the intrusive character of more traditional arrests. A suspect
who is taken to jail suffers a different kind of harm than one detained on the
street, even if he is released soon afterward.
Finally, just as arrests are distinct from Terry and traffic stops, though
they are all seizures under Fourth Amendment law, arrests are also distinct
from the pretrial detention and sentences of imprisonment that often follow
8. See id. at 117; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 414 (2005) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“There is no occasion to consider authority incident to arrest, however, for the police
did nothing more than detain Caballes long enough to check his record and write a ticket.”
(citation omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Chi. Police Dep’t, Special Order S06-01: Processing Persons under
Department Control (2015), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a56e4b-
12ccbe26-df812-ccbf-bb66447d9a33ff3e.pdf?hl=true [https://perma.cc/Z8F9-3YFQ] (detailing
the booking process used by Chicago Police Department); cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 601 (1990) (describing identifying booking questions as routine).
10. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (describing and approving DNA collec-
tion during arrest).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 150.20 (McKinney 2004). For a thorough analysis
of the workings of desk appearance tickets in New York City, see Mary T. Phillips, New
York City Criminal Justice Agency, The Past, Present, and Possible Future of Desk
Appearance Tickets in New York City (2014), http://www.nycja.org/library.php [https://
perma.cc/8MC5-BKCC].
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arrests, though they all involve incarceration. An arrest ends as soon as a
suspect is released (with or without charge) or his custodial status is subject
to judicial review.12 When a bail determination is made, any continuing cus-
tody is a form of pretrial detention, an infringement of liberty that is justi-
fied by overlapping, but different, aims. As this distinction suggests, an
arrest can have three lawful outcomes: (1) a suspect may be charged and
freed almost immediately on some form of stationhouse release; (2) he may
be charged and held until he sees a magistrate—often a day or two; or (3) he
can be released without an outstanding charge or further proceeding.
B. The Costs of Arrests
By its nature, every arrest diminishes a citizen’s freedom. It denies the
arrestee—albeit briefly—the possibility of living according to his own rea-
sons and motives. Protecting this kind of autonomy is a central goal of liber-
alism, and depriving a person of it is a moral and political harm. This alone
should lead to caution about arrests. But arrests also have more concrete
consequences, and yet the legal tools we generally use to evaluate them are
inadequate to consider whether those costs are justified.
In the near term, arrests are often frightening and humiliating. Arrestees
lose income during the arrest, and sometimes their jobs when they do not
show up for work.13  They pay arrest fees,14 booking fees,15 and perhaps at-
torney’s fees, if they hire a lawyer for their first appearance. If a suspect’s car
is towed because of an arrest during a traffic stop, he loses the value of the
12. That can be within a few hours for stationhouse bail or up to two days in the case of
a first appearance before a magistrate. See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991). Some states require that people arrested for particular crimes stay in jail for a mini-
mum amount of time, even if they post bond. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 764.9(c)
(LexisNexis 2003) (requiring mandatory holds for domestic violence); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
11-150(h)(1) (2012) (requiring a twelve-hour hold of any person accused of domestic violence
and found to be a threat to the alleged victim).
13. Cf. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Conse-
quences Can Last a Lifetime, Wall St. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402
(on file with Michigan Law Review) (describing individuals who had difficulty obtaining jobs
because of their arrest records, even when the charges against them were ultimately dropped).
14. For states charging police investigation fees for arrests, see, for example, Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. § 769.1f (LexisNexis Supp. 2016), 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9728(g) (West 2014), and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.01.160 (West Supp. 2016).
15. See Barbara Krauth & Karin Stayton, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fees Paid by Jail
Inmates: Fee Categories, Revenues, and Management Perspectives in a Sample of U.S.
Jails 30 (2005), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021153.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQG7-UP65]
(stating that 36 percent of jails responding to the survey imposed a booking fee ranging from
$3 to $168 before criminal proceedings took place). Some states impose booking fees by stat-
ute. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-1-104(n) (2014) (authorizing counties to impose up to a
$30 booking fee).
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time it takes to find his car, travel to the impound lot, and secure the vehi-
cle’s release, as well as the impound fees.16 An arrest can affect child custody
rights, it can trigger deportation, and it can get a suspect kicked out of pub-
lic housing.17 Over the long term, individuals with arrest records may have
worse employment and financial prospects.18 And all of these consequences
can occur even if the arrestee is never convicted of a crime.
As compared to simply charging someone with a crime and giving him
a summons to appear in court, arrests may increase the chances that a sus-
pect will be detained prior to trial.19 That in turn is linked to higher prison
sentences, which compound the deprivation of liberty caused by the arrest
itself.20 And as I noted previously, arrestees lose privacy. They are questioned
16. There is no comprehensive estimate of the number of cars towed or costs of im-
poundment as a result of arrests. For one example of fees resulting from a towed vehicle see
Ryan J. Stanton, The Big Business of Towing: Records Show Thousands of Vehicles per Year Im-
pounded in Ann Arbor, Ann Arbor News (Sept. 2, 2012, 5:57 AM), http://www.annarbor
.com/news/the-big-business-of-towing-thousands-of-vehicles-per-year-impounded-in-ann-ar
bor/ [https://perma.cc/3G9D-JZCA] (finding that in Ann Arbor individuals were charged a
$60 tow fee and privately contracted towing companies charged $120 per tow and $20 in daily
storage fees). Others have pointed out that arrests and impoundment have been used as a
revenue raising measure in cities such as Los Angeles. See Shelby Grad, Ferguson, Mo.’s, Alleged
Revenue Scams Echo in Southeast L.A. County, L.A. Times (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ferguson-missouri-abuses-echo-southeast-los-angeles-
county-20150305-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZPS8-Y77F].
17. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)5(iii)(A) (2016) (stating that a public housing lease may be
terminated “regardless of whether the covered person has been arrested or convicted for such
activity and without satisfying the standard of proof used for a criminal conviction”); 24
C.F.R. § 982.553(c) (2016) (analogous provision for Section 8 voucher); Clare M. Nolan,
California Research Bureau, Children of Arrested Parents: Strategies to Improve
Their Safety and Well-Being 11 (2003), https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03-011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7PE-6R2T]; Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2014)
(noting general consequences of arrest, including those related to child custody, deportation,
and eviction); FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics [https://perma.cc/M7ZE-777P] (implying that 41 per-
cent of deportations involved arrests of individuals with no prior criminal convictions).
18. See, e.g., Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 13 (citing a study by Tia Stevens Andersen
of the University of South Carolina indicating that those who were arrested, but not convicted,
earned $2,000 less on average and were 8 percent more likely to be in poverty than those from
a similar background who were never arrested); Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & Econ. 451
(2006); Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of
Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 Criminology 627 (2014); see also United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (“Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere
with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his em-
ployment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy,
and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.”).
19. See Terry L. Baumer & Kenneth Adams, Controlling a Jail Population by Partially
Closing the Front Door: An Evaluation of a “Summons in Lieu of Arrest” Policy, 86 Prison J. 386
(2006).
20. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Laura & John Arnold Found., Investi-
gating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes (2013), http://
www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8DLL-FJ35] (showing that, compared to defendants released prior to
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about their home address, birth place, and medical and psychological condi-
tions. They are likely to be photographed and fingerprinted, and to have
their clothing and personal property taken. They will often be subjected to a
strip search and a health screening when they enter jail, which can include
X-rays for tuberculosis and blood tests for gonorrhea or AIDS.21 Their DNA
may be taken and uploaded to the National DNA Index.22
Even the initial decision to arrest carries a risk of potentially serious
repercussions. Data about police use of force during arrests is notoriously
unreliable, but recent high-profile killings by police officers underscore that
every arrest involves a confrontation between a suspect and a police officer
that can go badly awry. Once a police officer attempts an arrest, he is au-
thorized to use force, sometimes deadly force, to enforce that decision.23 As a
result, arrests always risk and sometimes lead to injury or death.24 That risk
is likely to be far lower when an officer hands the suspect a citation and
permits him to go on his way.
For an example, recall that in July 2014, New York Police Department
officers were videotaped trying to arrest Eric Garner in Staten Island.25 Gar-
ner refused to be handcuffed, and he was forcibly taken to the ground. The
officer taking down Garner grabbed him by the neck. As a result of the hold
and his underlying health problems, Garner was unable to breathe and
trial, those detained were four times more likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment and
three times more likely to be given a longer prison sentence, even if the defendant is held for
only a few days); Mary T. Phillips, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Pretrial
Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases 26, 30, 35, 40 (2007) (linking
one day of detention with an increase in conviction and incarceration rates, even controlling
for other factors).
21. See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–1415 (2010) (requiring a blood test for gonor-
rhea, HIV, and other sexually transmitted diseases for those alleged to have committed sexual
offenses); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17-10-15, 31-22-9.1 (2013) (allowing required HIV testing upon
arrest for an AIDS-transmitting crime, at victim’s request); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-6001, 65-
6008, 65-6009 (2002 & Supp. 2014) (allowing infectious disease testing upon arrest for a crime
involving potential transmission, at victim’s request); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.445 (West 2011)
(allowing tuberculosis screenings in correctional institutions); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.940
(2014) (allowing a prosecuting attorney to require a test for sexually transmitted diseases);
Wisc. Stat. § 968.255 (2015) (allowing strip searches for persons who are arrested and de-
tained in jail).
22. See Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/K6ZN-NN6T]; see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013)
(“Twenty-eight States and the Federal Government have adopted laws similar to the Maryland
Act authorizing the collection of DNA from some or all arrestees.”).
23. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
11–12 (1985).
24. See Duren Banks et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Arrest-Related Deaths
Program Assessment 1 (2015).
25. See Annie Karni et al., Two Cops Pulled Off Streets, Staten Island DA Looking into
Death of Dad of Six After NYPD Cop Put Him in Chokehold During Sidewalk Takedown, N.Y.
Daily News (July 19, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/
staten-island-da-man-death-nypd-chokehold-article-1.1871946 (on file with Michigan Law
Review).
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died.26 It is clear from the video that Garner did not cooperate with his
arresting officers.27 Doing so might have averted the force used against
him.28 But it is inevitable that some arrestees will fail to comply with police
directives, and had officers never sought to arrest Garner, he would likely
still be alive. That is to say, arrests risk costly injuries and deaths, even when
the arrest and the force used to ensure it are legally justified.
For some, the Garner example triggers the intuition that, whether or not
criminal justice costs are predictable, we should worry less about those that
are within the suspect’s control.29 More generally, some who are unsympa-
thetic to recent critiques of criminal justice might be tempted to discount
the costs of arrests on the grounds that they accrue largely to criminals who,
after all, deserve them. That intuition is wrong. First, many arrests are for
crimes that are so minor that the harms of arrest would be far too serious a
punishment if they were imposed for a retributive or deterrent purpose.
Something like half a million arrests each year are for public drunkenness,
for example.30 Nearly that many again are for other violations of liquor laws,
such as having an open container in public.31 People are arrested for loiter-
ing, for vagrancy, and for gambling.32 In New York City, 1,600 people were
arrested in 2011 for putting their feet up on the subway.33 Eric Garner was
26. Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died From Chokehold During
Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/nyre
gion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html (on file with Michi-
gan Law Review).
27. Karni et al., supra note 25.
28. See Greg Botelho, Was a New York Police Officer’s Chokehold on Eric Garner Neces-
sary?, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/us/eric-garner-
chokehold-debate/ [https://perma.cc/73LA-P7LX] (including a discussion with Tom Fuentes,
former assistant director with the FBI, about an officer’s need to use force when someone
resists arrest).
29. See, e.g., Bob McManus, Blame Only the Man Who Tragically Decided to Resist, N.Y.
Post (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/12/04/eric-garner-was-a-victim-of-
himself-for-deciding-to-resist/ [https://perma.cc/V8G7-XGH4] (arguing that Eric Garner and
others who resist are to blame when they lose their lives and that, as criminals, the use of force
against them was justified).
30. Snyder, supra note 2, at 2; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2014 Crime in United
States, tbl. 29 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014.tables/
table-29 [https://perma.cc/978P-J4RC].
31. Snyder, supra note 2, at 2.
32. Id.; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 30, at tbl. 29.
33. See Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax, if You Want, but Don’t Put Your
Feet Up, N.Y. Times (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-of-
fense-on-ny-subway-can-bring-ticket-or-handcuffs.html (on file with Michigan Law Review).
This data was gathered independently by New York Times reporters looking at data obtained
from district attorney’s offices in the boroughs. Id. Better data might reveal a different
number.
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selling loose cigarettes.34 It is hard to say that these crimes “deserve” the
harms that come from arrests.
Even for more serious crimes, the minimum standard for a lawful arrest,
probable cause, is almost by definition not enough proof to establish blame-
worthiness.35 One could counter that in many cases, the police have far more
than probable cause of criminal activity: they actually see the crime. Even
then, when the proof is overwhelming, police officers are inappropriate in-
stitutional actors to determine culpability and sanction.36 The consequences
of arrests simply cannot be waved away on the ground that they are
deserved.37
In any case, the harms of arrests extend far beyond the suspects who
might have engaged in wrongdoing. When someone is arrested, his family
and community suffer, too. His family is deprived of the housework and
childcare he would have provided if he were home, and they fully feel his
lost income and weaker job prospects. When Eric Garner died, he had six
children, including a three-month-old baby, and three grandchildren, whom
he cared for and supported.38 All of them were harmed by the attempt to
arrest him.39 The suspect’s community experiences disruption as well, both
in feelings of insecurity and alienation and in more practical terms. Even
strangers are affected by arrests. When police engage in foot pursuits, car
chases, and physical struggles to complete an arrest, for instance, they risk
harm to bystanders, as well as suspects.40
34. See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. Times
(June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-
staten-island.html (on file with Michigan Law Review).
35. See Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (“[T]he term ‘proba-
ble cause,’ according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation . . . .”). Compare Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“These
long-prevailing standards [of probable cause] seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unrea-
sonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to
give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations
which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous,
room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.”), with Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,
16 (1994) (expressing concern that instructions demanding evidence “to a moral certainty”
may not demand an adequate level of proof to establish the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
proof necessary for conviction).
36. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1119,
1151–52 (2008) [hereinafter Harmon, Police Violence] (“[P]olice officers’ irregular and discre-
tionary decisions . . . hardly constitute the type of due process that supports punishing
suspects.”).
37. See Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 1, at 903 (“From a welfare perspective, all
costs matter, even costs to criminals, and even if they are fairly imposed.”).
38. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for
the Police, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-
man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html (on file with Michigan Law
Review).
39. See id.
40. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18 (2014) (describing how a passen-
ger was killed when police shot into a car to end a high speed chase); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
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Potential arrestees and their families may take costly precautionary mea-
sures to avoid arrests. Consider a woman who is repeatedly abused by her
husband. Many states either require or heavily favor arrests in response to
incidents of domestic violence.41 By encouraging arrests, these states seek to
correct a disturbing tradition of under-policing family violence, and arrests
can provide a crucial interruption in an ongoing violent encounter.42 But
knowing that her batterer will likely face arrest will predictably lead some
victims to suffer a beating rather than call 911 and take the risk that her
partner will lose his job or be deported.43 The harm done to that woman,
both physically and psychologically, during that beating—which the police
could have stopped if they had been called — is a consequence of our arrest
practices.
Arrests can also be problematic for the police officers who conduct
them. Officers put themselves at risk when they pursue fleeing suspects or
counter physical resistance.44 In fact, more officers are injured and killed
during arrests than during almost any other single police activity.45 Arrests
also affect public perceptions of the police, causing friction between com-
munities and departments, especially for minority communities that dispro-
portionately suffer the costs of arrests for minor offenses. That friction
372, 384 (2007) (describing the threat to pedestrians and other motorists from high-speed
police chases); Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1998) (discussing passenger
killed in police chase).
41. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.65.530(a) (2014) (requiring arrest upon probable cause
to believe that a crime of domestic violence was committed within the past twelve hours);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.137(1) (2015) (requiring arrest upon probable cause to believe that
within twenty-four hours battery was committed); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2–81.3(B) (Supp.
2016) (requiring arrest upon probable cause to believe there was an assault or battery on
family or a household member).
42. See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Jus-
tice Response 12529 (3d ed. 2003); J. David Hirschel & D.J. Dawson, Violence Against
Women: Synthesis of Research for Law Enforcement Officials 2–10 (2000), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/198372.pdf [https://perma.cc/F34D-CWQJ].
43. See Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 1, at 914 (describing precautionary costs
and citing Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence from
Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. Pub. Econ. 85, 93 (2009)).
44. See Cynthia Lum & George Fachner, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Police
Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and Reform: The IACP Police Pursuit Database 7
(2008), http://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Police_Pursuits.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XZ96-NPDD] (finding that between 1987 and 2006, 51.8 percent of officer fatalities were due
to automobile accidents or attempts to make arrests); Press Release, FBI, FBI Releases 2014
Preliminary Statistics for Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty (May 11, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2014-preliminary-statistics-for-
law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty [https://perma.cc/FT79-NGWF] (finding
that 16 officers were killed in 2014 during traffic stops or pursuits or during investigative
activities).
45. See 2013 Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted, Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion: Uniform Crime Reporting, tbl. 68, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2013/tables/table_68_
leos_asltd_circum_at_scene_of_incident_by_population_group_and_percent_cleared_2013.xls
[https://perma.cc/P2TC-KAXV] (showing that over 8,000 officers were assaulted during arrests
in 2013).
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causes fear among citizens and low morale and high stress for officers, who
in turn have more difficulty policing as a result.46
Finally, arrests are expensive for the towns and cities that carry them
out. Arrests take officers off the street, place demands on already
overburdened courts, and incur one or two days of jail detention costs.47
While there is no serious contemporary estimate of the cost of arrests to
municipalities, even a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that they
are substantial. According to the limited available research, an arrest averages
several hours of officer time, by some estimates as little as four, but by
others as much as 13.5 hours.48 Let’s call it five. That’s the time that an
officer is off the street handcuffing and transporting the suspect, drafting
paperwork, and processing him. The mean wage for a police officer is
around $30 an hour, not including overhead or benefits.49 On average, more
46. See, e.g., David Cruickshank, Recognizing the True Cost of Low Morale, Police Chief,
Sept. 2012, at 26 http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch
&article_id=2756&issue_id=92012 [https://perma.cc/GZT8-Y52B] (noting that low morale
leads to increased officer attrition, absenteeism, and lower productivity that harms commu-
nity-oriented policing); Justin Fenton & Justin George, Violence Surges as Baltimore Police Of-
ficers Feel Hesitant, Baltimore Sun (May 8, 2015, 9:35 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-police-prosecutors-morale-20150508-story.html [https://
perma.cc/ME45-SYJ3] (contending that many officers have begun to take a “hands-off” ap-
proach due to low morale and feelings that there is a lack of public support for the police);
Conor Friedersdorf, The Brutality of Police Culture in Baltimore, Atlantic (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-brutality-of-police-culture-in-balti
more/391158/ [https://perma.cc/SY4N-KN6C] (arguing that the unrest in Baltimore occurred
as a result of police use of force during the arrest of Freddie Gray and grew out of a history of
over-policing and unnecessary arrests); Richard A. Oppel Jr., West Baltimore’s Police Presence
Drops, and Murders Soar, N.Y. Times (June 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/
after-freddie-gray-death-west-baltimores-police-presence-drops-and-murders-soar.html (on
file with Michigan Law Review) (noting that the combination of officer morale issues and
safety concerns have led to a massive reduction in police presence in West Baltimore).
47. The deprivation of freedom that arises solely from the arrest is the deprivation be-
tween the moment the suspect is taken into custody and the moment he is seen for a bail
determination or released. That can be within a few hours, for stationhouse bail, or up to two
days in the case of a first appearance before a magistrate. See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1991). Some states require that arrests for particular crimes stay in jail for
a minimum time, even if they post bond. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 764.9c(3)(a)
(LexisNexis 2002) (requiring mandatory holds for domestic violence); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
11-150(h)(1) (2012) (requiring a person accused of domestic violence to be held for twelve
hours if the accused is found to be a threat to the alleged victim).
48. Terry Fain et al., RAND Corp., Los Angeles County Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act: Fiscal Year 2008–2009 Report 55–56 (2010), http://www.rand.org/con-
tent/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR832.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ3Y-
HD4U] (estimating 4 hours of officer time and 1.5 hours of detective review of the case for the
LAPD per arrest and 13.5 hours per arrest for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department);
L. Anthony Loman, Inst. of Applied Research, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the St.
Louis City Adult Felony Drug Court 43 (2004), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/SLFDC-
costbenefit.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNJ2-2LUV] (estimating 4 hours per arrest based on data
from the Missouri Highway Patrol).
49. See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2015: 33-3051 Police and Sheriff’s Pa-
trol Officers, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes333051.htm
[https://perma.cc/U9T2-4JTF] (finding an annual wage mean of $61,270 for police officers).
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than twelve million arrests have been conducted annually in recent years,
but round down to twelve million.50 In officer time alone—which is to say,
ignoring other law enforcement personnel and indirect costs, court costs,
some booking and transportation costs, and jail costs—state and local gov-
ernments spend more than $1.8 billion each year on arrests. Or, if one pre-
fers, arrests consume something like sixty million hours of officer time that
could be used for patrol, for problem solving, or for other community pri-
orities.51 Costs to municipalities and counties, like all of the other costs of
arrests, whether physical, financial, psychological, or social, and whether to
suspects, families, officers, or communities, should be considered in assess-
ing the appropriateness of arrest as a dominant law enforcement tool.
II. The Law of Arrests
Taken together, the costs of arrests are substantial. Overwhelmingly,
these harms do not arise from bad arrests or police misconduct. People suf-
fer them even when they are arrested legally and without excessive force. Yet
we often assume that if arrests are legal, and in particular, if they comply
with the Constitution, then they are normatively justified, at least most of
the time.
This assumption is plausible, but it is wrong. Given that arrests are
costly deprivations of liberty, they should, as a normative matter, be im-
posed only when they serve a significant state interest, when the risk of harm
is not grossly disproportionate to that interest, and when they are used
fairly.52 The Fourth Amendment is the Constitution’s primary way of regu-
lating arrests, and Fourth Amendment doctrine purports to weigh the harm
to the individual against societal interests when evaluating searches and
seizures.53 It therefore seems reasonable to think that when an arrest satisfies
the constitutional standard, it will also meet the conditions for normative
justifiability, at least most of the time.
In practice, however, though Fourth Amendment doctrine is framed in
terms of balancing competing interests, the probable cause requirement for
initiating arrests does not ensure that the government has an interest in car-
rying out an arrest, as opposed to starting the criminal process in another
way. Nevertheless, other Fourth Amendment law assumes that once proba-
ble cause exists, the state’s interest in making an arrest justifies many other
50. See Snyder, supra note 2, at 2.
51. As the example of officer time suggests, not all of the costs of arrests are deadweight
losses. But many of them, such as the harms of force used to conduct arrests, are.
52. See Harmon, Police Violence, supra note 36, at 1166 (arguing police should use force
only in response to an imminent threat to a legitimate state interest, when necessary to defend
that interest, and when using force would not create a risk of harm grossly disproportionate to
the interest being protected).
53. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”).
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intrusions. As a result, Fourth Amendment law is a poor proxy for good
arrest policies.
A. Fourth Amendment Law and the State’s Interest in Arrests
An arrest is the paradigmatic state seizure, and the Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.54 Arrests
must therefore be reasonable. One can think of reasonableness in Fourth
Amendment law as having three components: Police must have a constitu-
tionally reasonable basis for initiating the search or seizure, given its scope.55
That basis for initiation must be assessed by a reasonable method.56 And the
search or seizure must be carried out in a reasonable manner.57 Although the
Supreme Court has set minimum standards for arrests along each of these
lines, those standards do not ensure that arrests serve important government
interests or impose costs proportional to those interests.
1. Probable Cause and Arrests
Under Fourth Amendment doctrine, “[a] police officer may arrest a
person if he has probable cause to believe that person committed a crime,”58
that is, if the facts and circumstances would lead a prudent person to con-
clude that the arrestee had carried out or was carrying out a criminal act.59
The Court has long viewed this standard to be sufficient to accommodate
both the individual’s interests in liberty and the government’s interests in
law enforcement, because it represents “the accumulated wisdom of prece-
dent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary” to establish
54. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969) (“Nothing is more clear than
that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory
detentions.’ ”).
55. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (indicating that an arrest
may be constitutional if an officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect is violating the
law).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–15 (1976) (holding constitu-
tional a statutorily authorized warrantless arrest in public); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (emphasizing that an officer usually must obtain judicial approval before initiating
a search, even where probable cause clearly exists).
57. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (“Petitioners and appellant
argue that if [the probable cause] requirement is satisfied the Fourth Amendment has nothing
to say about how that seizure is made. This submission ignores the many cases in which this
Court . . . has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is
conducted.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) (“The manner in which the seizure and
search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were war-
ranted at all.”).
58. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
59. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76
(1949).
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that an arrest is reasonable.60 Thus, given probable cause, an officer may
“make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining
whether . . . [the] arrest was in some sense necessary.”61 It does not matter
whether the person faces only a fine for punishment or whether he poses
little threat to the public.62 Nor does it matter whether the state can adjudi-
cate the suspect’s guilt equally well without an arrest.63 Even bad motives do
not negate the constitutionality of an arrest based on probable cause64: of-
ficers may use arrests to humiliate, to intimidate, or to exact revenge, all
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
The rule that probable cause legally justifies an arrest is so longstanding
and pervasive that it is not defended or subject to scrutiny.65 Unlike in other
Fourth Amendment contexts, where the Court expressly weighs government
and individual interests in determining what the Fourth Amendment re-
quires,66 the Court reasons differently in the context of arrests: “In a long
line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe
a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of
private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.”67 Probable cause is, by assertion, “the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating [the] often opposing interests” of the gov-
ernment in carrying out arrests and of individuals in avoiding them.68
On its face, the probable cause standard seems a strange means of bal-
ancing the individual’s and the government’s interests in arrests, since it
does not directly incorporate any of those interests. Rather, it measures how
much evidence the government has that the suspect committed a crime. The
standard makes sense only in light of the Court’s reasoning about the rela-
tionship between suspected criminals and public safety. In the Court’s view,
60. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1970 (2013) (“It is beyond dispute that ‘probable cause provides legal justification for
arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the adminis-
trative steps incident to arrest.’ ” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975))).
61. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208
(1979) (“The standard of probable cause . . . applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to
‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.”).
62. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
63. See id.
64. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (“[O]nly an undiscerning
reader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate
police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause . . . .”).
65. In fact, the Court has suggested that such defense is unnecessary because the balance
of interests is beyond doubt. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008).
66. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1963 (2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
67. Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354); see also Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949).
68. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
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probable cause safeguards individuals “from rash and unreasonable” inter-
ferences with privacy, liberty, and unfounded charges of crime, and there-
fore protects them.69 And at the same time it permits the government to
pursue its “duty to control crime,”70 a duty that the Court views as generat-
ing “a strong interest in protecting public safety by taking into custody those
persons who are reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activ-
ity.”71 Thus, the argument for the probable cause standard presumes that
(rather than considers whether) the government needs to arrest criminal
suspects in order to control crime. The Court takes it as ipse dixit that the
government’s interest in law enforcement is coequal to an interest in arrest.
When confronted with cases that highlight that the government can
have probable cause to arrest without a strong interest in making an arrest,
the Court has repeatedly doubled down. Thus, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
permits custodial arrests for fine-only offenses, for which public safety argu-
ments for custody are at their weakest.72 Whren v. United States allows
pretextual arrests in which the government may have no legitimate interest
in arresting the suspect.73 And Virginia v. Moore rules constitutional even
those arrests on probable cause that the state itself has declared do not serve
state interests.74 As even the Court admits, existing Fourth Amendment doc-
trine permits arrests that do not serve any government interest.75
Though these cases highlight that the Court takes the state’s interest for
granted, even if the Court were to overturn Atwater, Whren, and Moore, the
character of Fourth Amendment doctrine on initiating arrests would remain
largely intact. Prohibiting fine-only misdemeanor arrests or ill-motivated ar-
rests might restrain the government when its interests in arresting a suspect
for a crime are most minimal, but it would not undermine the theory that
drives the constitutional law of arrests. According to the Court, by presump-
tion, so long as the government has defined an activity as criminal, or even
as a violation, it has sufficiently strong reason to make an arrest.
2. Warrants and Arrests
The assumption that the government has a strong interest in arrests ex-
tends beyond the probable cause requirement. In some areas of Fourth
69. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176).
70. Id.
71. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
112).
72. 532 U.S. at 354. Atwater dealt with a fine-only misdemeanor. 532 U.S. at 323. The
Court has since extended its Atwater analysis to arrests for fine-only noncriminal traffic viola-
tions. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (per curiam).
73. 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). Although Whren could be narrowly read to permit
pretextual stops rather than pretextual arrests, the Court has expressly extended its earlier
analysis to pretextual arrests for fine-only traffic violations. See Sullivan, 532 U.S at 772.
74. 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
75. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346–47 (“If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the
uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail.”).
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Amendment doctrine, warrants are used to ensure that the police only con-
duct especially intrusive actions, such as entering a home to search it, with
good grounds to do so.76 The idea is that some activities are so consequential
that the government should first explain its reasons for acting to a neutral
arbiter, rather than subject individuals to serious harm based solely on the
judgment of police officers and only give recourse to argue about legality
later.77 In the Court’s view, arrests are not this consequential. Generally, ar-
rests may be conducted without warrants,78 precisely because the Court sup-
poses the state’s interest in arresting criminal suspects is strong even without
prior judicial determination.79
Of course, the warrant “requirement” has many exceptions that have
arisen because the Court views the government’s interests in immediate ac-
tion as making warrants unnecessary or counterproductive.80 But it is not
because arrests must be carried out without delay that the Court exempts
most arrests from warrants.81 Instead, in the exceptional cases where the
Court does require warrants for arrests—non-exigent arrests in homes, it is
clear about its reasoning:
To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all
arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too
substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant . . . even when it is
accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly
present.82
That is, it is not that the Court considers warrants unworkable for arrests
most of the time. Rather, it is motivated by the idea that entries into
homes—unlike the autonomy, bodily integrity, and broader social harms
that accompany all arrests—are so consequential that warrants are necessary
76. E.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967).
78. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975) (“[The Court] has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant. . . .
[A] policeman’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for ar-
resting a person suspected of crime . . . .”); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
422–23 (1976) (holding that a warrantless arrest for a felony in public does not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
79. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991).
80. E.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (“[W]arrants are generally re-
quired to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948)); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search of arrested suspect and area
within control for weapons justified by officer safety concerns); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (“hot pursuit” exigency justified by public safety
concerns).
81. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Watson, 423 U.S. at 423–24.
82. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting
United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 216 (1981).
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to ensure they are legally justified.83 After all, an officer without a warrant
may simply wait for the suspect to leave the house and arrest him then.84
Even when a police officer obtains an arrest warrant, the warrant pro-
cess does not ensure that the arrest serves a government interest in taking
the person into custody. Instead, it offers additional assurance only that the
government has sufficient evidence to suspect a crime. To get a warrant, an
officer must establish probable cause to a magistrate’s satisfaction before the
arrest instead of soon afterward (at the suspect’s initial appearance). Though
the timing differs, magistrates issue warrants using the same standard that
officers use for arrest, based on evidence that the suspect has engaged in
criminal wrongdoing.85 They do not evaluate whether public safety is pro-
moted by the arrest or whether the magnitude of the crime justifies the
intrusion on the individual. With warrants or without them, Fourth
Amendment law permits arrests without scrutinizing the government’s in-
terest in carrying out an arrest rather than beginning criminal proceedings
some other way.
3. How Arrests Are Conducted
The Court builds on its assumption that arrests are essential to the gov-
ernment when it evaluates what officers can do to a suspect when they arrest
him. The Court has permitted a variety of exceptionally intrusive govern-
ment activities on the theory that they are important in carrying out arrests.
Yet, in doing so, the Court does not analyze the government’s interest in
taking the suspect into custody, because it takes that matter to be resolved by
the law on when arrests may be initiated.
At the moment of arrest, the Court permits handcuffing arrestees, even
for trivial offenses, because it is ordinary practice and ensures officer
safety.86 Similarly, regardless of the crime in question or the circumstances
of an arrest, a legal arrest establishes grounds for searches of the arrestee’s
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. But see Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213 (contend-
ing that a search warrant protects privacy while an arrest warrant protects against arrest with-
out probable cause).
84. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 221. If waiting becomes counterproductive—because the sus-
pect might harm someone inside or destroy evidence or escape unnoticed—then the officer
may simply go in to make the arrest without a warrant. See id.
85. Compare, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (describing the process for procuring an arrest
warrant) with, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(b) (“If a defendant is arrested without a warrant, a
complaint meeting Rule 4(a)’s requirement of probable cause must be promptly filed in the
district where the offense was allegedly committed.”); see also, e.g., Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(a)
(describing similar state process for issuing arrest warrants).
86. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351–52 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that searches of vehicles incident to arrest pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),
are unnecessary because “[w]hen an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police
virtually always have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety—and a
means that is virtually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting
him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car”); Atwater, 532
U.S. at 354–55 (finding that when Atwater “was handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and taken
to the local police station” for a seat belt offense, her arrest was “no more ‘harmful to . . .
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person and the area surrounding him incident to arrest.87 According to the
Court,
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not
depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intru-
sion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.88
Once an arrestee gets to jail, an arrest may entail further, even greater,
intrusions because the government needs them once it makes an arrest. In
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Court permitted routine booking questions to
fall outside the protections of Miranda v. Arizona,89 in order to facilitate
processing an arrestee.90
In Maryland v. King, it permitted routine DNA collection and testing
because law enforcement needs “a safe and accurate way to process and
identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”91 The
Court’s logic is simple:
It is beyond dispute that “probable cause provides legal justification for
arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to
take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Also uncontested is the
“right on the part of the Government . . . to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested.” . . . “The fact of a lawful arrest, standing
alone, authorizes a search.” . . . When probable cause exists to remove an
individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in legal cus-
tody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.92
And in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burling-
ton, the Court permitted every arrestee entering a jail to be required to strip,
open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his
privacy or . . . physical interests’ than the normal custodial arrest” and therefore was constitu-
tional based on probable cause (omissions in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 818 (1996))); see also United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998)
(calling handcuffs “one of the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest”); United States
v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[H]andcuffs are restraints on freedom of move-
ment normally associated with arrest. Clearly, the thought of allowing police officers to hand-
cuff persons when probable cause to arrest is lacking is a troubling one.” (second emphasis
added)).
87. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973).
88. Id. at 235; accord Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1975 (2013)).
91. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (emphasis added).
92. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970–71 (first quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14
(1975); then quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), overruled by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and then quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979)).
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genitals to enable officers to search for scars, tattoos, and contraband, re-
gardless of the risk he may pose.93 After all, “[p]eople detained for minor
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals,”94
and case by case determination of that risk “may be difficult, as a practical
matter.”95 Not only is every suspected criminal presumed to be worth arrest-
ing, he is also presumed to be potentially armed and dangerous, a status that
justifies additional harm.
After an arrestee is processed, an arrest can legally include a night or two
in jail, maybe more with good justification,96 even though the state has sig-
nificant control over how quickly an arrestee gets an initial hearing.97 And an
arrestee’s conditions of confinement are no better than those who await trial
or sentencing, even when no magistrate has considered the grounds for his
arrest.98 The Court permits considerable harm to arrestees in order to mini-
mize risk and administrative burden to the government. Those decisions are
expressly premised on the Court’s view that, by establishing probable cause,
the state has already demonstrated a sufficient interest in carrying out arrests
to justify attendant harms.
Perhaps most importantly, if an arrest is based on probable cause, the
Court has found it reasonable under Fourth Amendment law for officers to
use force—including extreme force—to achieve it.99 That is, although the
government need not provide a reason for an arrest beyond criminal suspi-
cion, the law assumes arrests are not only worth doing, but worth doing
violently, at least if the suspect resists or tries to flee. Though Fourth
Amendment doctrine evaluating uses of force purports to balance the intru-
sion on the individual “against the countervailing governmental interests at
stake,” the doctrine takes for granted the value of arrests as a means of serv-
ing the government’s interests in criminal law enforcement and public
safety.100 Thus, officers may use violence against a suspect who threatens the
success of the arrest, whether or not arresting him was socially useful in the
first place, whether or not he poses any risk to the public, and whether or
93. 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520–22 (2012).
94. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520.
95. Id. at 1521.
96. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991).
97. Id. at 69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that states place various time restrictions on
arraignments).
98. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1521 (referencing an expert in the case who argued that
interaction between misdemeanants and felons requires that misdemeanants go through the
same search procedure as felons).
99. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Our Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
100. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983)).
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not another method, such as issuing a citation, would have been adequate to
bring him to court. Arrests are considered so integral to the government’s
interest in pursuing criminal activity that, when the state chooses to carry
them out, they justify any harm necessary to complete them.
The Supreme Court has established one categorical exception to this
rule: the Court concluded in Tennessee v. Garner that “[i]t is not better that
all felony suspects die than that they escape.”101 For this reason, a police
officer may not shoot a fleeing suspect who, in light of his actions and sus-
pected crime, poses no threat to the officer or to others.102 But even in limit-
ing deadly force against escaping arrestees, the Court never evaluated the
government’s interest in and need for arrests. Instead, it reasoned that
“deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting
the criminal justice mechanism in motion.”103 It is only in this extreme
case—when the suspect’s interest is so fully exterminated by the use of force
and the government’s interest in the arrest is so weakly promoted by it—
that the Court put a hard limit on violence used to achieve an arrest. Else-
where, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence presupposes that the state must,
in its discretion, be permitted to carry out, even violently, any arrest for
which it has sufficient evidence.104
B. Constitutional Reasoning in Delineating Lawful Arrests
I have argued that the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine governing
arrests assumes rather than evaluates whether arrests serve important state
interests. The probable cause standard does not ensure that any particular
arrest serves the public interest. More generally, the Court, in formulating
doctrine, has not questioned the public interests that might justify arrests.
However, even if the Court were more willing to scrutinize the government’s
reasons for conducting arrests, when the Court does weigh competing indi-
vidual and government interests in Fourth Amendment arrest doctrine, it
also frequently tilts its analysis in favor of the government because of con-
cerns that are particular to constitutional analysis. For this reason, Fourth
Amendment doctrine is unlikely to ever reflect the balance between the gov-
ernment and individual that a fuller consideration of the interests at stake
warrants. The probable-cause-and-no-more rule could well be right as a
matter of constitutional law, but good constitutional law is not always good
policy.
For example, the Court has justified the probable cause standard as a
product of tradition, and tradition matters in constitutional law.105 Justice
101. 471 U.S. at 11.
102. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
103. Id. at 10.
104. Although the state may make any arrest under Fourth Amendment law, the Constitu-
tion does not ever require that it do so. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309–10 (1966)
(“There is no constitutional right to be arrested.”).
105. E.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168–71 (2008) (“In determining whether a
search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
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Powell put it this way: “An arrest . . . is a serious personal intrusion regard-
less of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. . . . But logic some-
times must defer to history and experience.”106 The core of that history is
beyond dispute, which explains why no Justice has ever suggested that the
government give reasons beyond establishing a quantum of evidence of guilt
before making arrests, at least for imprisonable offenses.107 But if the ques-
tion is whether our use of arrests today makes sense, tradition seems a weak
argument for what is, by any reckoning, a costly, liberty-denying practice.
In addition to relying on tradition, the Court has often justified permis-
sive arrest doctrines on the ground that they are easier for federal courts to
implement, a concern that does not apply to arrest law and policy more
broadly. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, for instance, the Court extended
the probable-cause-only rule to minor offenses, even though the rule re-
sulted in an unjustifiable, “pointless,” and “gratuitous” arrest in that case,
and could easily do so in the future.108 Of course, any general formulation
might get some cases wrong, and police officers may sometimes require
straightforward rules for reasons that justify the error rate. In this case, how-
ever, the Court rejected finer-grained alternatives on the ground that—even
beyond any law enforcement need for simple rules—courts need especially
easy-to-apply rules for arrests to facilitate judicial review.109
Similarly, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court rejected the argument that an
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment when, though based on probable
cause, it was expressly prohibited by state law.110 Though many view an ille-
gal arrest as obviously unreasonable, the Court provided Constitution-spe-
cific arguments for its seemingly counterintuitive result that police action
could be clearly unlawful and still constitutional.111 Following Atwater, for
instance, the Moore Court reasoned that if it made the Fourth Amendment
and state law coextensive, then “[t]he constitutional standard would be only
as easy to apply as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated
indeed.”112 Of course, police officers already have to apply state law in con-
ducting arrests, but courts might struggle with the analysis.
411, 422–24 (1976) (declining to require arrest warrants for felons arrested in public because
“the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public
arrests on probable cause”).
106. Watson, 423 U.S. at 428–29 (Powell, J., concurring).
107. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 362–63 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that “in the case of felonies punishable by a term of imprisonment, we have held
that the existence of probable cause is also a sufficient condition for an arrest,” but “[w]hile
probable cause is surely a necessary condition for warrantless arrests for fine-only offenses, any
realistic assessment of the interests implicated by such arrests demonstrates that probable
cause alone is not a sufficient condition” (citation omitted)).
108. See id. at 346–48.
109. Id. at 347.
110. 553 U.S. at 168–78.
111. Moore, 553 U.S. at 168–78.
112. Id. at 175.
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Finally, for similarly insular reasons, the Court rejected in Moore and in
Whren outcomes that would limit arrests at the cost of causing Fourth
Amendment law to “vary from place to place and from time to time.”113 It
found such variation unworkable in constitutional law, even if variable rules
could lead to more reasonable arrests. In both Atwater and Moore, the Court
sought to make sure that Fourth Amendment arrest doctrine is easily ad-
ministrable by courts.
More generally, in this context as in others, the Supreme Court resists
upending the rules developed in earlier cases. This faithfulness to precedent
ensures the stability of law over time and thereby promotes the legitimacy of
the judicial enterprise. This is a distinctly judicial concern: since other public
institutions do not face the same kinds of legitimacy concerns, they do not
have nearly as strong reasons for maintaining previously made decisions
even when they might be wrong.114 But maintaining stable law can come at
the cost of restraining change even when that change would otherwise serve
the public interest.
The Court is also constrained by the text of the Constitution itself, or at
least by its interpretations of that text. Since the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its “unreasonable” arrests, the wording might not seem like much of a limi-
tation on good outcomes, but it can easily permit arrests that are
constitutional and yet unjustifiable by other measures. For example, the
Court has concluded that the reasonableness requirement in the text re-
quires a solely objective inquiry. For this reason, in a variety of Fourth
Amendment settings, including arrests, the Court has refused to scrutinize
the subjective motivation of officers in deciding constitutionality:115
“[U]lterior motive” does not “serve to strip . . . agents of their legal justifica-
tion,” because the Fourth Amendment is only concerned with objective cir-
cumstances, “whatever the subjective intent.”116 Thus, whatever an officer’s
reason for conducting an arrest, the seizure is constitutional if it is sup-
ported by probable cause.117 By contrast, when other constitutional amend-
ments are implicated, the Court considers motivation relevant in evaluating
the behavior of state actors.118 This contrast suggests that, by the Court’s
own lights and without the constraint of its understanding of “unreasona-
ble,” bad intent could matter in evaluating arrests. Indeed, most of us think
113. Id. at 172 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
114. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
115. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001); Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
116. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812, 814 (emphasis omitted).
117. This is true unless another constitutional provision is also implicated by the arrest,
such as the Equal Protection Clause, which does concern itself with subjective motivation. See
id. at 813; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
118. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (using an apparently sub-
jective standard for a Fourteenth Amendment claim of excessive force); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319–20 (1986) (applying a subjective standard to an Eighth Amendment claim). But
see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) (holding that the proper standard for
evaluating a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is objective unreasonableness).
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that arrests meant to humiliate or to intimidate are illegitimate, whether or
not the Fourth Amendment says so.
I am not arguing that the Court should change Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Rather, these examples suggest that constitutional law is unlikely to
be a good stand-in for the justifiability of arrests, because the Court permits
arrests for reasons that have nothing to do with the competing interests in
them. The consequence is that good arrest policy must be made by institu-
tions other than courts using something other than constitutional law. This
should come as no surprise. As I have argued elsewhere, “Constitutional
rights are . . . structurally ill suited to balance societal interests in law en-
forcement and individual freedom.”119 Among other reasons, constitutional
rights set minimum rather than best standards for government conduct, and
they do not adequately take into account the aggregate effects of state coer-
cion.120 The consequence is that meaningfully balancing competing individ-
ual and social interests requires analysis beyond the Fourth Amendment.121
I suggested above that an arrest practice cannot be normatively justified
unless it generally leads to arrests that serve important societal goals, im-
poses harms in reasonable proportion to the significance of those goals and
how well arrests serve them, and is fairly carried out. In Part I, I argued that
we engage in a massive number of arrests and that those arrests impose
significant harms. The scope of these consequences suggests that our existing
arrest practice must serve significant societal goals well to be justifiable. In
this Part, I have argued that Fourth Amendment doctrine does not ensure
that legal arrests meet that test. It neither ensures that legal arrests serve
important state ends nor fairly balances societal and individual interests. But
if law is not the proper standard for evaluating arrest practices, how should
we proceed?
Most commentary on arrest has focused on fairness. Scholars and critics
often argue that arrests are racially biased or are too forceful.122 These im-
portant concerns, however, sometimes obscure an analytically prior one, an
issue the Court has taken for granted: whether arrests as we carry them out
today serve important state interests and are proportional to those interests.
Given the consequences of arrests, evaluating our arrest practice requires
determining whether and how well arrests serve societal goals in comparison
to less harmful alternatives.
119. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 776 (2012)
[hereinafter Harmon, Problem].
120. See id. at 776–81.
121. See id. at 763.
122. See, e.g., Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Deci-
sions, 49 Criminology 473 (2011); Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth
Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 823 (1990) (discussing the use of
excessive force during arrests and proposing bright-line rules for dealing with force during
arrest); Harry Levine, The Scandal of Racist Marijuana Arrests—and What to Do About It,
Nation (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/scandal-racist-marijuana-arrests-
and-what-do-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/8GQD-HHVK].
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III. Do We Need Arrests?
Why, then, do we arrest? At a high level of abstraction, arrests illustrate
a fundamental truth about policing: police exist both to protect and to limit
liberty. Public safety and public order are preconditions of any free society.
Sometimes achieving those goals requires controlling individuals who
threaten them. Though police officers have many roles, the most critical is
pursuing order and safety on behalf of the state through commands,
through uses of force, and especially through arrests. If police cannot do that
job without arrests, then our practice of arrests might well be justified, de-
spite the harm it causes. None of us would have much in the way of freedom
without it.123 This is the position of the Supreme Court, which has all but
assumed that “[b]eing able to arrest . . . individuals is a condition precedent
to the state’s entire system of law enforcement.”124 Is the Supreme Court
right? Just how badly do police need arrests?
The Court has frequently noted two specific ways arrests promote pub-
lic safety and order. First, according to the Court, arrests are essential to
start the criminal process and prevent criminals from escaping that pro-
cess.125 Second, arrests prevent suspects from continuing disruptive or crimi-
nal activity.126 On occasion, the Court has mentioned a third benefit of
arrests: arrests help the government collect evidence useful in prosecuting
123. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (“The most
basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his
property. These ends of society are served by the criminal laws which for the most part are
aimed at the prevention of crime. Without the reasonably effective performance of the task of
preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized
values.” (citation omitted)); cf. Edward L. Barrett Jr., Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest
to Release or Charge, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 11, 15 (1962) (“Liberty is equally lost whether the
citizen is left to the mercy of an overzealous policeman or a trigger-happy hoodlum.”).
124. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (quoting Brief of Petitioners, Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (No. 83-1070), 1984 WL 566026, at *14).
125. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 (2001) (“An officer not quite sure
that the drugs weighed enough to warrant jail time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk
of flight would not arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the offense
called for incarceration and the defendant was long gone on the day of trial. Multiplied many
times over, the costs to society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to
defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked . . . .”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 114
(1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody, . . . [t]here no longer is any danger that the suspect
will escape or commit further crimes . . . .”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (“An arrest is
the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society’s interest in having
its laws obeyed . . . .”).
126. This is true in the Court’s view of both serious offenses and minor ones. Compare
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419 (1976) (“The public safety, and the due apprehen-
sion of criminals, charged with heinous offences, imperiously require that such arrests should
be made without warrant by officers of the law.” (quoting Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281,
284–85 (1850))), with Atwater, 532 U.S. at 349 (“But is it not fair to expect that the chronic
speeder will speed again despite a citation in his pocket . . . ?”).
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criminals.127 Unfortunately, the Court has never seriously evaluated how im-
portant arrests are in achieving these goals. Doing so is essential to assessing
our practice of arrests.
In this Part, I consider the major ways arrests are thought to serve the
state’s interests: by bringing criminals to justice, by reducing crime and dis-
order, by managing violent criminals, and by enabling collection of evi-
dence. I argue that, at least for large categories of crimes, citations and
summonses are likely to be an adequately reliable method of bringing sus-
pects to trial. In fact, by drawing a comparison with our current practice of
pretrial release, I suggest that, even for felonies, officers could reasonably
rely on citations in many cases. Officers can also use measures short of arrest
for order maintenance and to gather evidence. Moreover, police can deter
crime without relying on widespread arrests. In each case, I conclude that
the argument for using arrests is not as strong as it seems, especially given
the high costs of arrests and the available alternatives.
A. Arrests to Start Criminal Proceedings
The most traditional view of arrests treats them as a critical part of the
process leading to criminal punishment.128 As is well known, we punish
criminals both to further retributive aims and to make society safer by deter-
ring and incapacitating those who threaten that safety. Accusing the defen-
dant and adjudicating his guilt are prerequisites for convicting and
punishing him, and arrests have long been the first step in accusation and
adjudication.129 Assuming there is good reason to engage in the criminal
process to control and punish prohibited behavior, the question is how im-
portant arrests are in adjudicating criminal cases and punishing the guilty.
127. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173 (2008) (“Arrest ensures that a suspect ap-
pears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables
officers to conduct an in-custody investigation.”); id. at 174 (“[A]rrest will still ensure a sus-
pect’s appearance at trial, prevent him from continuing his offense, and enable officers to
investigate the incident more thoroughly.”).
128. See Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody 3
(1965) (“In most cases, decisions to charge, to convict, and to sentence are made only with
respect to those persons whom the police have first arrested. Thus, to a large extent, this
decision determines those offenders against whom the official process is to be invoked.”); Cyril
D. Robinson, Alternatives to Arrest of Lesser Offenders, 11 Crime & Delinq. 8, 8–9 (1965)
(“Arrest has thus become the ordinary mode of beginning a criminal prosecution. As a result,
arrest is not a process merely preliminary to possible punishment; it frequently is the punish-
ment where the lesser offender is concerned.”).
129. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (“An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompa-
nied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows.”).
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For much of criminal law history, criminal prosecutions began no other
way.130 But today, of course, not all criminal cases begin with an arrest. In-
stead, many criminal cases start with some form of summons or citation.131
A summons—which can be issued by a judge in lieu of an arrest warrant—is
an order to a suspect to appear in court on a particular date to answer a
criminal charge or violation. A citation, called a summons in some jurisdic-
tions, acts in lieu of an arrest and can be issued by a police official. It per-
mits a suspect to remain out of custody upon the promise or expectation
that he will appear to answer charges in court on a later date. Both are
distinguishable from arrests in that suspects bring themselves to court rather
than being placed there.
Criminal summonses and citations remind us that even if arrest is the
ordinary way to start the criminal process, there is nothing essential in the
practice from the perspective of adjudicating criminal guilt. A summons
equally demands that an individual answer criminal charges. A defendant
responding to one is equally subject to booking and processing. He has a bail
hearing, an arraignment, and a probable cause hearing just like an arrestee.
Clearly, criminal suspects can be charged, tried, and convicted without an
arrest.
Moreover, summonses and citations have some considerable advantages
as substitutes for arrests. Even apart from their benefits for criminal sus-
pects, they offer substantial cost savings for municipalities in officer time,
transportation costs, and detention costs.132 They may reduce conflicts be-
tween the police and citizens because giving citations is less confrontational,
which could decrease the total number of officers and suspects injured dur-
ing efforts to start the criminal process.133 And because they produce fewer
consequences and fewer confrontations, citations probably alienate heavily
impacted communities less than arrests. In sum, using alternatives to arrest
can improve criminal justice as well as minimize deprivations of liberty.
These advantages explain why most departments use citations to some
degree.134 In fact, some minor offenses, such as trespassing and possession of
130. See Barrett, supra note 123, at 16–18; Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va.
L. Rev. 315, 334 (1942).
131. Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Citation in Lieu of Arrest: Examining Law
Enforcement’s Use of Citation Across the United States 10 (2016) [hereinafter IACP],
http://www.pretrial.org/download/law-policy/Citation-in-Lieu-of-Arrest-IACP-LJAF-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4Z6-P4CJ].
132. Debra Whitcomb et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Citation Release 17–18 (1984),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/94200NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DT7-
GVVT]; see also IACP, supra note 131, at 17–19.
133. See Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Citations in Lieu of Arrest, Literature
Review 18 (2016) [hereinafter IACP, Literature Review], http://www.iacp.org/Portals/0/
documents/pdfs/Citation%20in%20Lieu%20of%20Arrest%20Literature%20Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4CS-62SK] (suggesting that citations could be safer for officers than ar-
rests, though noting that no research supports the proposition).
134. IACP, supra note 131, at 10, 18 (finding that while most departments use citations,
they do so to varying degrees, and only weakly track their use in lieu of arrest).
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marijuana, are frequently addressed through citation.135 But arrests remain
the default mechanism for starting the criminal process. Millions of arrests
continue to occur each year, and the law continues to favor arrests over
citations.136 Officers have broad discretion to arrest, even when citations or
summonses would serve state interests.
Arrests are likely necessary under some circumstances: some suspects
may be so dangerous if released or so unlikely to be brought to justice for a
serious offense that their arrest would serve the public interest better than
any alternative.137 But right now we largely take for granted that arrests are
widely justified to start criminal adjudication and that departments and in-
dividual officers can balance the interests at stake. Citations would seem to
have significant untapped potential. So why don’t we use them more?
Partly, tradition. An arrest followed by an appearance before a magis-
trate was historically the only means of starting the criminal process.
Through the early 1900s, even those charged solely with traffic violations in
the United States were automatically arrested.138 As cars became widespread
and driving became more heavily regulated, this practice became burden-
some. Police departments developed, and states authorized, new procedures
to allow police officials to release those detained for traffic offenses at the
stationhouse.139 Eventually, these stationhouse procedures evolved into field
citations, in which an officer at the scene could accept a promise to appear
without ever taking the suspect into custody. By the 1940s the use of cita-
tions for traffic offenses became more widespread.140
Citations for criminal offenses did not become commonly available for
several more decades. The expansion of citations to cover minor crimes fol-
lowed the first bail-reform movement of the early 1960s, which sought to
reduce the costs and consequences of pretrial detention.141 Experiments in
pretrial release suggested that a defendant’s individual characteristics could
be used to predict whether he would be likely to appear in court if he were
released until his trial, and that a promise to appear could be as effective as
money bail in ensuring that appearance.142 If criminal suspects could be ef-
fectively sorted for release or detention pending trial, it seemed reasonable
to believe they could similarly be sorted for citation rather than arrest.143
135. Id. at 3.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 228–236.
137. See IACP, supra note 131, at 11–12.
138. Whitcomb et al., supra note 132, at 1.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1–3.
142. See Floyd Feeney, The Police and Pretrial Release 18 (1982); Whitcomb et
al., supra note 132, at 2; Mark Berger, Police Field Citations in New Haven, 1972 Wis. L. Rev.
382, 384.
143. Feeney, supra note 142, at 18; Whitcomb et al., supra note 132, at 2; Berger, supra
note 142, at 385-86.
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After successful experiments in the late 1960s in New York City, major
police and criminal justice organizations around the country strongly advo-
cated giving police officers discretion to issue citations in place of misde-
meanor arrests.144 States widely adopted laws authorizing police to issue
citations for minor crimes, and by the early 1980s, all but nine states author-
ized citations for some criminal offenses.145
Despite this enthusiasm, in 1984, a major Justice Department report
lamented that, though citation release was good policy and good law, it was
still relatively uncommon.146 Among other explanations, the Justice Depart-
ment speculated that police resisted and misunderstood the use of citations
and that policymakers did not adequately support the laws.147 Whatever the
reasons, by the early 1980s, more than a decade after the first experiments
with citations for criminal offenses, citations accounted for a small propor-
tion of police encounters resulting in criminal charges in many
jurisdictions.148
These obstacles to replacing arrests with citations might have been over-
come in time. Certainly, the Justice Department thought the difficulties were
manageable. But in the mid-1980s, criminal justice priorities shifted dramat-
ically. Fear of rising violent crime and the crack epidemic led to new “tough
on crime” rhetoric and policies. Minimizing harm by releasing criminal sus-
pects suddenly seemed a much less appealing notion and citations have
stayed invisible in conversations about criminal justice for decades, except
recently and in small pockets.149 In the meantime, additional criminaliza-
tion, a greater number of arrests, and additional costs for arrestees made
arrests more consequential than ever.
History is not the only explanation for the ubiquity of arrest today. Ar-
rests have one overwhelming advantage over citations: they guarantee the
defendant’s presence to answer charges, a critical aspect of contemporary
criminal process.150 A citation is only an effective alternative to an arrest if
the defendant actually appears pursuant to its command. Whereas an arrest
guarantees that the criminal adjudication will start as planned, a citation
144. Whitcomb et al., supra note 132, at 2.
145. See id. at 3. Even where states did not formally authorize the practice, some depart-
ments issued criminal citations. See id. at 3–4.
146. See id. at 8.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 3, 5, 8.
149. See, e.g., IACP, supra note 131 (noting lack of recent attention and arguing that it is
time to research citation use further); Gloria Pazmino, Vance Announces Manhattan Summons
Overhaul, Politico (Mar. 1, 2016, 6:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-
hall/story/2016/03/vance-announces-manhattan-summons-overhaul-031836 [https://
perma.cc/CP3V-25ZE] (describing a new policy of issuing summons in lieu of making arrests
for minor offenses).
150. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (“[T]he Government has a substantial
interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials and, ultimately, for
service of their sentences, [and] confinement of such persons pending trial is a legitimate
means of furthering that interest.”).
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risks that it will not. Many people fear that if more citations were given,
many defendants would fail to appear, and the state’s interest in effective law
enforcement would be undermined rather than furthered.151
If we replace arrests with summonses and citations, most criminal de-
fendants would still likely come to court. After all, most people show up
when released on their own recognizance, and they (mostly) do not jump
bail.152 Even apart from the social norms that shape legal compliance, most
people would accurately expect that if they fail to appear to answer for crim-
inal charges, they could be subject to additional penalties.153 But even if most
defendants appear as intended, some presumably will not.
When the risk of nonappearance is high, it might not be worth tolerat-
ing. But, for most offenders, the fact that a citation would generate uncer-
tainty does not mean that an arrest is better, all told. Arrests are pretty
intrusive. To the degree that citations are a meaningful and cost-effective
way of achieving the criminal justice ends we now use arrests to serve, they
need not be perfect to be preferable. Ultimately, to get the balance between
arrests and citations right, we need to know more about the benefits, risks,
and costs of each tool.154 As of now, the research comparing failure to appear
rates for arrests and citations suggests that the risks of expanding citations
are not overwhelming.155 But the studies are too few, too limited, and too
dated to draw strong conclusions.
What we do know suggests the rate at which suspects fail to appear for
court proceedings is highly malleable. Jurisdictions can increase appearance
pursuant to citations by screening out the suspects least likely to appear if
151. IACP, supra note 131, at 20; IACP Literature Review, supra note 133, at 15–16.
152. See Thomas H. Cohen, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release and
Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008–2010, at 16 (2012), www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5GM-8D7W] (indicating that only 1% of those
released on their own recognizance and only 2% of those released on financial bail in federal
criminal cases from 2008 to 2010 failed to appear); Brian A. Reaves, Bureau Of Justice
Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical Tables 21
(2013), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UTM-4Y2F] (indicating
that 17% of those released in state felony cases in the largest urban counties in 2009 failed to
appear).
153. E.g., Ala. Code § 11-45-9.1(h) (LexisNexis 2008) (“If the defendant fails to appear as
specified in the summons . . . any person who willfully violates his written promise or bond to
appear . . . shall be guilty of the separate offense of failing to appear . . . .”); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-426 (2008) (“Any person failing to appear or otherwise comply with the command of a
citation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-215(b)(3) (2015)
(“The failure to appear in court on the date and time specified is a separate criminal offense
regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the person is originally summoned[.]”).
154. IACP, supra note 131, at 4. For example, though law enforcement officials believe
that citations may lead to fewer use-of-force incidents and officer injuries, no research has
considered the issue. Id. at 18.
155. See, e.g., IACP, Literature Review, supra note 133, at 15–22; Whitcomb et al.,
supra note 132, at 43–52; Berger, supra note 142, at 407–08; Floyd F. Feeney, Citation in Lieu
of Arrest: The New California Law, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 367 (1972); Jeffrey M. Allen, Comment,
Pretrial Release Under California Penal Code Section 853.6: An Examination of Citation Release,
60 Calif. L. Rev. 1339 (1972).
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cited; by reducing obstacles to appearing as required; and by optimizing
consequences for failures to appear. Each of these is a familiar and managea-
ble criminal justice challenge.
For instance, many people fail to appear pursuant to the terms of cita-
tions because they are sick, because they forget the date of their appearance,
or because they cannot find the courtroom, rather than because they inten-
tionally resist adjudication.156 In one study, over half of the failures to appear
were solved by continuing the case for a week and informing the suspect of
the new day, with no additional penalty for the initial failure to appear.157 If
a jurisdiction limits the time between when the citation is given out and the
appearance date, provides clear information about location and time, and
gives suspects additional reminders about appearances, it may, at little ex-
pense, minimize failures to appear after release—and therefore lessen the
risks of eliminating many arrests. New York City recently announced re-
forms along these lines. It has started to make robocalls and send text
messages to remind people of court dates following summonses, and the city
has also started to allow individuals to come to court any time in the week
before a scheduled appearance to make appearing in court more
convenient.158
Connected to the issue of failures to appear is the idea that officers can-
not always verify the identity of people with whom they interact.159 A sus-
pect whose identity is unknown may be less likely to show up pursuant to a
citation and will be a lot harder to find if he does not. Moreover, unless an
officer can identify a suspect, the officer cannot easily check whether the
person is wanted for a more serious crime, or is a recidivist or has failed to
show up for prior court appearances, circumstances that might justify arrest.
In addition, without reliable identification, the officer cannot create a mean-
ingful record of the current offense. As a result, identification issues can
degrade the information we have on prior criminal conduct. For these rea-
sons, identification doubts have long been used to justify arrests.160
While real, the problem of identifying suspects is far less substantial
than it used to be. Quite simply, technology that helps officers determine
who a suspect is becomes stronger, cheaper, and more pervasive every day,
and it is increasingly available to officers in the field. Nearly 90 percent of
the driving age population holds a driver’s license.161 Most of those cards
156. Berger, supra note 142, at 408.
157. Id. at 407–08.
158. Michael Schwirtz, New York City Plans to Transform Summons Process, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/nyregion/new-york-city-to-transform-
the-summons-process-for-courts-and-recipients.html (on file with Michigan Law Review).
159. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“[I]n every criminal case, it is
known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried.” (quoting Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004))).
160. See Whitcomb et al., supra note 132, at 20.
161. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Highway Finance Data Collection, Off. of Highway Pol’y
Info., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm [https://
perma.cc/YVH2-DCBW] (last modified Nov. 7, 2014).
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already comply with recent federal standards designed to make them harder
to fake, and more will do so soon.162 Even fake licenses are less useful to
those seeking to avoid identification than they once were, because the police
can check them against federal databases in the field, which can reveal mis-
matches in physical characteristics and appearance.
Those without government-issued identification are increasingly identi-
fiable by fingerprints or other biometric data, since there are more than 100
million Americans with fingerprints in national databases and twenty-three
million front-facing photographs linked to them.163 It is also becoming eas-
ier and easier to check those biometrics on the fly. Police departments have
already started using mobile biometric technology that allows officers to
quickly fingerprint, photograph, and scan the irises of individuals in the
field and check them against federal databases to determine identity, crimi-
nal record, and the existence of outstanding warrants.164
One might lament the loss in privacy these technologies represent, but
the means of identifying people on the street are ineluctably expanding. That
expansion makes it possible for a police officer to be assured that someone is
who he says he is. When an officer knows the identity of a person, he can
better evaluate whether that person should be arrested, because, for exam-
ple, he has a track record of failing to appear. And a known suspect is easier
to track down if he fails to appear, which means a citation in lieu of an arrest
will be more likely to begin the criminal process effectively. In these ways,
new means of assuring identity weaken identity uncertainty as a justification
for making an arrest rather than issuing a citation.
Technology not only affects how easy it is to identify someone, but also
how easy it is to find him if he fails to appear. As a result, changing technol-
ogy not only undermines the case in favor of arrests, it strengthens the case
for citations. Almost all of us now leave an extensive digital trail when we
162. See REAL ID Enforcement in Brief, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., http://www.dhs.gov/
real-id-enforcement-brief [https://perma.cc/M4EH-AL7Z].
163. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Next Generation Identification (NGI)
Monthly Fact Sheet (Dec. 2015) (indicating that the federal biometric repository contained
109, 298,272 entries as of December 2015); Ellen Nakashima, FBI Wants to Exempts Its Huge
Fingerprint and Photo Database from Privacy Protections, Wash. Post (June 1, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-wants-to-exempt-its-huge-fingerprint-
and-photo-database-from-privacy-protections/2016/05/31/6c1cda04-244b-11e6-8690-f14ca9d
e2972_story.html [https://perma.cc/EL75-Y6RZ] (noting that the FBI database contains more
than 100 million fingerprints and 45 million facial photos); Next Generation Identification
(NGI), Fed. Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-o
ther-biometrics/ngi [https://perma.cc/3YVF-GD2D] (defining and describing the function and
goals of the NGI biometric system).
164. See Jeffrey A. Rose, The Future of Corrections: How Can Mobile Biometric Technology
Revolutionize the Arrest and Booking Process?, Police Chief, Dec. 2014, at 68 (2014),  http://
www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=3585
&issue_id=122014 [https://perma.cc/82YS-AG9K] (describing mobile identification technol-
ogy that can take and check an individual’s thumbprint against law enforcement databases in
under a minute). The same technology also permits patrol officers to book and process sus-
pects in the field, taking fingerprints, photographs, and demographic information, thus mak-
ing it unnecessary for a suspect to report for booking before his court date. See id.
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use credit cards, bank cards, electronic benefits transfer (EBT) cards,
monthly transit cards, electronic tolling devices (like FasTrak and E-ZPass),
and many other location-based services and devices. Most departments have
automated license plate readers that can be used to track the whereabouts of
drivers.165 More than 90 percent of us own cell phones, which allow police to
determine where we are in real time, as well as where we have been.166 Police
departments use surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology to
find suspects with outstanding warrants or those who jump bail.167 Even a
skilled and determined person has a difficult time hiding if anyone is look-
ing. Most criminals do not stand a chance against determined law
enforcement.
I am not suggesting that if we replaced arrests with citations, everyone
who did not appear would be easily found. For the moment, many of the
common methods for looking for people remain resource intensive, and
those who are now arrested are likely harder than average to find. Moreover,
much of the time, no one bothers to hunt for suspects who fail to appear,
though that is often because they were not worth charging with a crime in
the first place.168 But, taking it as given that we should issue citations only to
those whose adjudication is in the public interest, as technologies make it
cheaper to find those who hide, it may be possible to locate almost all of
those who do not attend court dates. Some defendants would presumably
always slip through the cracks—either because they could not be found or
165. See, e.g., Robert Faturechi, Use of License Plate Photo Databases Is Raising Privacy
Concerns, L.A. Times (May 16, 2014, 9:29 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-law-
enforcement-contractors-20140518-story.html [https://perma.cc/T35U-FGJG].
166. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, Pew Res. Ctr. (Oct. 29,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/ [https://
perma.cc/5A8R-M8LF] (reporting cell phone ownership data in the United States). For exam-
ple, the U.S. Marshals Service, which apprehends federal fugitives, has used devices, known as
stingrays, that simulate cell towers to look for more than 6,000 suspects. See Brad Heath, U.S.
Marshals Secretly Tracked 6,000 Cellphones, USA Today (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:13 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/02/23/us-marshals-service-cellphone-stingray/80785616/
[https://perma.cc/N55V-Q6S7].
167. E.g., Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth
Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 430 (2011) (describing facial recogni-
tion technology); Tristan Hallman, With New Surveillance Cameras, Police Have More Eyes in
the Sky than Ever, Dallas Morning News (Sept. 16, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.dallasnews
.com/news/metro/20150916-with-new-surveillance-cameras-police-have-more-eyes-in-the-
sky-than-ever.ece [https://perma.cc/CV5Y-4WSV].
168. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Criminal History Informa-
tion Systems, 2014 tbl. 5a (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S88P-KPT2] (showing over 7.8 million outstanding warrants in state and
federal databases with the vast majority being only for minor offenses); Dep’t of Justice,
Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 6, 55–56 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson
_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8CP-XR8J] (finding that in Ferguson, MO,
16,000 out of a population of 21,000 people had outstanding warrants, most of which were for
traffic violations or ordinance infractions).
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were not worth finding—but the end result might still be a significant im-
provement on current arrest practice, achieving a high level of compliance
with legal process while reducing the costs and damages associated with
arrests.
These arguments suggest that the most traditional argument for arrests
—that arrests are essential to begin the criminal process—is no longer per-
suasive. Using citations in place of arrests increases liberty and reduces costs.
Assuming that failures to appear can be managed in cost-effective ways,
something technology increasingly ensures, then for most defendants worth
arresting, citations will be a credible alternative. Moreover, citations are only
one alternative to arrest, and not a particularly radical one. If you think that
it is simply not acceptable to give up on adjudicating a criminal charge be-
cause a defendant chose not to turn up in court, and that is why you want
him arrested, you might find a different substitute for arrests more appeal-
ing: continue without him.
It is not as crazy as it sounds, especially for misdemeanants. As scholars
have repeatedly pointed out, the vast majority of arrestees receive very lim-
ited criminal process.169 They are arrested for petty offenses en masse, often
without probable cause.170 Prosecutors are unlikely to notice the weakness of
these cases because they give the evidence almost no scrutiny. And why
should they? If the case against a defendant is not quickly dismissed he may
be effectively forced to plead guilty at his arraignment with little advice from
counsel in order to avoid serving more time before trial than he would re-
ceive as a sentence if convicted.171 It may be unfair to advocate by compari-
son to the existing system of processing misdemeanor defendants—
implicitly treating it as a baseline for procedural adequacy—when most
commentators lament the absence of misdemeanor process. Still, would the
system really be so much worse if some of those defendants were never pre-
sent at all?
An officer with probable cause could issue a citation directly to the sus-
pect on the street. Most suspects would appear, and the criminal process
would proceed as it does now. If the charges are not dismissed, defendants
would have avoided being taken into custody and could make a good case
that since they showed up at their court appearance, they should remain free
until trial. If a defendant fails to appear, the charges could still be dismissed,
or the arraignment could be postponed, or finally, it could continue without
him with a new summons issued for trial.
If the defendant then appears at trial, he is not in much worse a position
than he would be if he had been arrested. If he does not appear on his trial
date, the case could be continued or dismissed, or it could go ahead without
169. E.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1315 (2012); see,
e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2464,
2492–93 (2004); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117 (2008).
170. Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1332; see Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice:
Control Without Conviction, 119 Am. J. Soc. 351, 374 (2013).
171. See Bibas, supra note 169, at 2492–93; Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1315.
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him. At trial, the prosecutor would be required to present evidence sufficient
to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant would
be acquitted. Defense counsel could still be assigned to challenge the govern-
ment’s case by cross-examining witnesses, making legal objections, and ar-
guing about whether the government has met its burden. Assuming the
defendant is convicted, a sentencing date would be set, and once again, pro-
cess would be served.
Trials in absentia sound unconstitutional, but in these circumstances,
they might not be, at least for misdemeanants. Defendants have long been
held to have a right to be present at trial, one that grows out of a defendant’s
due process and Sixth Amendment rights.172 But defendants can choose to
waive that right.173 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, for exam-
ple, a suspect may consent to trial in absentia for misdemeanors.174 More
importantly, defendants can effectively forfeit the right to be present if, for
instance, they choose not to return to court once a trial has started, or if
they persist in disruptive conduct in the courtroom.175 In those cases, trial
and sentencing can and do proceed without the defendant, even for serious
crimes.176 Given this tradition, it is not much of a stretch to conclude that a
defendant also forfeits his right to be present at trial when he receives actual
notice of his trial date and he fails to appear. In that case, we might continue
in his absence.
In fact, misdemeanor trials in absentia are not that different from traffic
tickets. In many states, ignoring a traffic ticket for just a couple of weeks
justifies a default judgment against the defendant.177 If there is something
terrible about forfeiting one’s right to be present at trial, one would think
permitting default judgments with no trial, often for the same crimes, would
172. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884).
173. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18–19 (1973); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 455 (1912).
174. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(2).
175. See Taylor, 414 U.S. at 19–20 (permitting waiver based on voluntary absence from
trial, even though defendant was not warned that trial would continue in his absence); Allen,
397 U.S. at 342–43 (1970) (finding waiver “if, after [the defendant] has been warned by the
judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 106 (1934) (noting that right could be lost by “consent or at times even by misconduct”),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
176. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c); Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. The Supreme Court has held that
Rule 43 only applies when the defendant is present at the beginning of trial, but it has not held
that this aspect of the rule is constitutionally mandated. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S.
255, 261–62 (1993).
177. E.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291D-7(d)–(e) (LexisNexis 2010) (specifying that a
default judgment shall be issued if a person fails to answer a traffic infraction notice within 21
days); Me. R. Civ. P. 80F(k)(1) (specifying that the clerk enter a default judgment if a defen-
dant fails to respond to a traffic violation notice within 20 days); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 46.63.070(1), (6) (West 2012) (stating that a person who fails to respond to a notice of traffic
infraction within 15 days shall be ordered to pay the penalty for the infraction).
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be worse. Some misdemeanors are far more serious than traffic violations.
Assaults and vandalism, for instance, are not comparable to speeding or fail-
ing to yield. But given the high rate of guilty pleas and the weak expressive
value of misdemeanor convictions,178 we might not lose much by permitting
defendants to be tried in their absence even for these more serious crimes.
My point is not that trials in absentia are a good idea. Given the tradi-
tional role the defendant’s presence plays in American due process, they
probably aren’t. Managing failures to appear in other ways—by setting new
hearing dates, by finding defendants, and by dropping some prosecutions,
for instance—is likely preferable. Still, thinking about using citations with
trials in absentia should focus our attention on just how problematic our
system of arrest is: even this unappealing alternative would likely vindicate
our interests in criminal justice and our concerns for the defendant better
than the current system. Given that, we cannot say that arrests are necessary
to start the criminal process.
B. Arrests to Maintain Order
While lawyers treat arrests as the start of the criminal process, police
officers and the scholars who study them often view arrests as a way to
resolve threats to order rather than as a way to enforce criminal law. The
reason you call 911 rather than a social services agency when something bad
is happening is because police, in the words of Egon Bittner, have the unique
capacity to “coerce a provisional solution upon emergent problems without
having to brook or defer to opposition of any kind.”179 It has long been true
that “any policeman worth his salt is virtually always in a position to find a
bona fide charge of some kind when he believes the situation calls for an
arrest.”180 And since arrests solve many problems, much of the police capac-
ity to coerce provisional solutions is located in their power to arrest.
Some legal scholars reject the legitimacy of using criminal prohibitions
as an excuse to make arrests to maintain order rather than basing arrest
decisions on the need to enforce criminal law. Wayne LaFave argued in his
1965 book on arrests that any arrest for a purpose other than prosecution
represents a misuse of discretion.181 More recently, in 2015, Elina Treyger
argued that criminal prosecution—and not other ends—should be the goal
178. Alexandra Natapoff, Why Misdemeanors Aren’t So Minor, Slate (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:33
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/04/misdemeanors_
can_have_major_consequences_for_the_people_charged_.html [https://perma.cc/VC3Q-SP
UK].
179. Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in
The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice 17, 18 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974).
180. Id. at 27.
181. See LaFave, supra note 128, at 437–38 (1965) (“The making of an arrest intended to
culminate in release of the suspected offender rather than in his prosecution is said to be both
illegal and unlikely.”).
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of any arrest.182 If you agree with such sentiments, then it should not take
much to persuade you that police should not retain the power to arrest in
circumstances in which prosecution, if it happens at all, is intended merely
to legitimize an arrest conducted for other purposes. But even if you think it
is okay to arrest people to maintain order, you might still wonder whether
we need arrests to achieve this goal, or whether less costly tools would serve.
Many order-maintenance arrests occur when police respond to individ-
uals who are disturbing others. An officer might arrest a mentally ill person
who is behaving bizarrely on a street corner, an intoxicated man yelling
noisily in a residential area, or a homeless person panhandling aggressively.
In each case, an arrest solves the problem. In recent years, many depart-
ments have sought to prevent repetitive disorder problems by using ap-
proaches to policing, such as problem-solving policing and community
policing, in which they collaborate with communities to fix the conditions
that encourage disorder.183 These efforts, which frequently employ both
noncoercive measures and strategic arrests, have had success in reducing dis-
order and therefore in reducing arrests.184 Nevertheless, it is not always pos-
sible to prevent the kinds of disorder that police must address. Police officers
also need more immediate solutions.
Of course, police already have at hand several less coercive measures to
resolve disruptive behavior. Police often use verbal commands and orders to
disperse before they even consider arrest,185 and those practices should be
encouraged. Officers trained to respond to calls involving mental distur-
bance can often be especially effective in defusing situations with fewer ar-
rests and fewer injuries.186 Still, some disruptions resist these techniques as
well.
182. See Elina Treyger, Collateral Incentives to Arrest, 63 U. Kan. L. Rev. 557, 592 (2015)
(“The prosecution principle as normative principle, however, persists in the background of
policing and criminal jurisprudence as a guide for police discretion, rather than a legal man-
date. Instead of legally sanctioning contrary arresting behavior as in the past, the prosecution
principle is now best viewed as channeling arresting behavior towards the same ends. The
prosecution principle is an aspiration.” (emphasis omitted)).
183. See Joel B. Plant & Michael S. Scott, Center for Problem-Oriented Polic-
ing, Effective Policing and Crime Prevention 32 (2009), http://www.popcenter.org/li
brary/reading/pdfs/mayorsguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CAB-QXET] (describing problem-ori-
ented policing).
184. See David Weisburd et al., Is Problem-Oriented Policing Effective in Reducing Crime
and Disorder? Findings from a Campbell Systematic Review, 9 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 139
(2010).
185. See Nat’l Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing 68–69
(Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (describing the use of verbal commands and
dispersal as an alternative to physical force).
186. See President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 56 (2015) [hereinafter Final Report
of the President’s Task Force], http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalre
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6KW-4BDK] (recommending the widespread adoption of crisis-
intervention training developed in Memphis, Tennessee); Kelli E. Canada et al., Crisis Interven-
tion Teams in Chicago: Successes on the Ground, 10 J. Police Crisis Negots. 86 (2010).
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Though citations, tickets, and summonses are practical alternatives to
arrests intended to make suspects answer criminal charges, they are much
less useful for quickly addressing disorder. After receiving a citation, sus-
pects who are drunk may continue to be excessively noisy, those who are
angry may return to their fight, and those who are soliciting clients for pros-
titution to support a drug habit may persist in walking the street. In each
case, the disorder might continue or soon be repeated following a citation.
Moreover, disruptive conduct of the kind that leads to police intervention is
often closely tied to mental illness, homelessness, drug abuse, and alcohol-
ism.187 These social problems sometimes lead to disorder precisely because
they interfere with individual capacity to conform to behavioral norms, even
when police are present. The same conditions may also make it less likely
that individuals will be dissuaded from their conduct by citations.188
If a suspect is unresponsive or likely to continue disorderly conduct,
then police may find removing the disruptive person from the situation the
most effective way to defuse an order problem. As Egon Bittner pointed out,
and as many repeat today, a vast code of low-level misdemeanors and viola-
tions ensures that an arrest is almost always a credible legal mechanism to
facilitate that removal.189 But that does not mean that the need to remove a
person always justifies an order-maintenance arrest.
First, a police officer can take someone off of the street without taking
him to jail. If an individual with a serious mental condition poses a threat to
himself or others, he can be detained for further psychiatric evaluation.190 If
he needs social services, he can be taken to a crisis response drop-off center
for the mentally ill, a detox center for those who are high or drunk, or a
drop-in shelter for the homeless, to the degree one is available.191 If he sim-
ply needs to be returned to a supportive environment, he can be given a ride
home. Any of these will mitigate the immediate problem without the conse-
quences of an arrest. This is not to say that criminal charges are never ap-
propriate for public order offenses. But the decision to remove a disruptive
person from the situation and the decision to charge him with a crime can
both be separated from the decision to arrest him.
187. See Canada et al., supra note 186.
188. Citations also raise other special problems for vulnerable populations, who may have
trouble appearing at fixed court dates and paying fines, and who can be more difficult to find
if they fail to appear.
189. See Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society 108 (1970).
190. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (West 2016); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 27-65-
105 (2015); Wis. Stat. § 51.15 (2015).
191. See H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental Health, 53 Psychiatric Servs.
1266 (2002) (describing the use of mobile crisis teams and drop-offs to mental health profes-
sionals to assist police in dealing with the mentally ill); Henry J. Steadman et al., A Specialized
Crisis Response Site as a Core Element of Police-Based Diversion Programs, 52 Psychiatric
Servs. 219 (2001) (describing the characteristics of three mental health and substance abuse
drop-off centers that make them effective alternatives to arrests for the mentally ill and drug
dependent).
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Second, a police officer can often prevent someone from continuing a
crime by removing him from the scene of the incident briefly rather than by
an arrest.192 Two men engaged in a shoving match outside a bar might stop if
given a few minutes to cool down. This kind of detention could not be justi-
fied as a Terry stop. Although we think of Terry stops as the primary tool for
conducting shorter seizures than arrests, lawful Terry stops are brief and
investigative,193 which makes them ill-suited for this purpose. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has also repeatedly sanctioned non-Terry seizures that
extend beyond the scope of a permissible Terry stop, but do not involve a full
formal arrest. For example, a police officer may conduct traffic stops for the
purpose of giving a warning, ticket, or citation, if the officer has probable
cause,194 and that detention may be as long as necessary to address the in-
fraction.195 Pedestrians may be similarly detained beyond the scope of a
Terry stop in order to give an officer a chance to issue a citation or ticket, if
the detention is based on probable cause. And stationhouse detentions with-
out arrest for the purpose of gathering evidence are permissible so long as
they are based on probable cause.196 If the Fourth Amendment permits these
seizures, it could similarly permit short field detentions based on probable
cause that criminal activity has occurred and would be likely to recur absent
some brief form of restraint.
A lawful field detention of this kind would allow officers to detain sus-
pects temporarily, with or without citing them, and then let them go on
their way, so long as the seizure was reasonable and not “prolonged beyond
the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission.”197 Unlike Terry and
its progeny, which provides for a less-than-arrest seizure on less-than-proba-
ble cause, a field detention for order maintenance would constitute a less-
than-arrest seizure based on enough justification for an arrest.198 In an hour,
many suspects will sober up, calm down, or lose the opportunity to be dis-
orderly. Thus, a field detention could hinder continuing offenses without
imposing the full negative consequences of an arrest.
The idea of field detentions raises obvious objections. Though it may be
less consequential than an arrest, it is still harmful. Even a brief detention
deprives a suspect of time and autonomy and subjects him to humiliation
192. Police might also use this strategy to address those who resist a less coercive alterna-
tive to arrest, such as, an order to disperse.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 706 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
194. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998).
195. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).
196. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
197. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
198. In this way, this suggestion is different than that proposed in the pre-Terry Uniform
Arrest Act. It provided for field detentions of up to two hours in order to question suspects,
but like Terry stops, those detentions were intended to by investigative and based on less than
probable cause. See Warner, supra note 130, at 320–21.
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and perhaps risk of injury. Since the detention would be less time consum-
ing for the officer than an arrest, officers might do many more of them,
including in circumstances in which they would have been unlikely to make
an arrest. Introducing field detentions therefore risks reducing the harm of
individual police-citizen interactions only to make it up in volume. Terry
stops and frisks arguably have had this problem, at least in some jurisdic-
tions; and, as with Terry stops, Fourth Amendment law would not provide a
check against this risk. Constitutional rights weigh the fairness of each coer-
cion, not the harm efficiency of police practices all told.199 This means that
limiting the overall costs of field detentions would require action in the po-
litical arena rather than in the courts.
Unfortunately, local politics are often an inadequate constraint on the
harms of policing.200 Moreover, the political process can only be effective
when the public and their agents can accurately assess police conduct.201 The
brevity and informality that makes police detentions less intrusive than ar-
rests also makes them more difficult to monitor and therefore more suscep-
tible to abuse, much as Terry stops are.202 And, as with Terry stops, field
detentions that do not result in criminal charges will rarely be to subject to
judicial review. State legislatures and departments could mitigate the risk of
abuse by ensuring that field detentions are reported and recorded, and by
setting up mechanisms for reviewing their justification. Technologies that
make it harder for patrol officers to evade scrutiny—cameras, computer-
aided dispatch, radios, and GPS, for example—could also facilitate account-
ability, at least if someone bothered to look at what officers were doing. But
field detentions nevertheless pose accountability risks.
Given these risks, I do not know whether regulated field detentions are
good policy. They may be more intrusive than other means of maintaining
order that have not yet been implemented to their full potential, such as the
multidisciplinary police-community response teams recommended by the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.203 But if implemented well,
they would probably also be less harmful than widespread order-mainte-
nance arrests. An arrest offers a swift and certain way for an officer seeking
to impose a provisional solution to address disorder. But it is not the only
way to solve order problems, and given the harms of arrests and the poten-
tial of alternatives, it is one that is increasingly difficult to justify.
199. See Harmon, Problem, supra note 119.
200. See Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 1, at 884–91.
201. See id. at 944; Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing, 96 Marq. L.
Rev. 1119, 1123–24 (2012).
202. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Newark
Police Department 9 n.8 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/
07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RB-H989] (describing problems with
“backseat detentions” in Newark).
203. See Final Report of the President’s Task Force, supra note 186, at 44.
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C. Arrests for Violent Crimes
So far, I have mostly discussed alternatives to arrest using examples of
misdemeanors, which account for more than 80 percent of arrests.204 The
same arguments apply to most felonies. A few states already permit citations
for some felonies.205 While substituting citations for arrests in felony cases
may seem radical, states already widely permit judges to issue summonses
instead of arrest warrants for felony defendants, which have the same effect
of commanding them to court rather than compelling their presence.
Even so, most people would think that there is one category of arrests
that is beyond dispute: arrests for serious violent crimes.206 Not even the
most enthusiastic advocates of citations have suggested using them for the
approximately 5 percent of arrests that are for violent felonies.207 And rules
allowing summonses instead of arrest warrants either expressly exclude these
felonies or they implicitly do so by requiring judges (and often prosecutors)
to agree that a summons should be issued in lieu of arrest.208 I will not try to
make a case for eliminating all of these arrests. Some serious offenders are
likely to be so dangerous, or so unlikely to be brought to justice otherwise,
that they are worth arresting. But even for violent crime, our intuition that
arrests are essential is untrustworthy. Our experience with pretrial release
suggests that we can make evidence-based predictions about which suspects
are likely to reoffend before arraignment or are likely to fail to appear for
court dates. If so, then it is very likely that our practice of arresting suspects
for these crimes could be curbed significantly without risk of significant
harm to public safety or order.
However much we think we need arrests to ensure that suspects show
up in court generally, our instincts tell us that we need them more so for
violent offenders. The risk and consequences of flight seem especially high
204. R. LaFountain et al., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Examining the Work of
State Courts: An Analysis of 2008 State Court Caseloads 47 (2010), http://
www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx
[https://perma.cc/MM69-2ZM2].
205. See IACP, Literature Review, supra note 133, at 4. Some states say nothing about
the range of statutes for which citations may issue, and two states expressly permit citations for
a narrow range of felonies. Id.; see, e.g., La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 211 (2016) (allowing
issuance of a citation for felony theft or illegal possession of stolen things if value is between
$500 and $1,000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.055 (2015) (allowing issuance of a citation for felonies
authorized by law to be reduced to a misdemeanor). In any case, citations are rarely used this
way. IACP, supra note 131, at 11.
206. I have assumed as much myself. See Harmon, Police Violence, supra note 36, at 1150
(2008) (stating that it “seem[s] obvious” that “police must be able to arrest individuals for
serious crimes, even if they resist”).
207. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the
United States, 2014, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that in 2014, 498,666 out of 11,205,833
arrests were for violent crimes); IACP, supra note 131, at 11 (finding that agencies rarely use
their authority to issue citations in lieu of arrest in felony cases, including violent felonies); id.
at 6 (quoting organizations in favor of expanding the use of citations); Whitcomb, et al.,
supra note 132.
208. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 4; Ohio R. Crim. P. 4(A); Va. R. Crim. Prac. & P. 3A:4.
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for violent crimes. A suspect who fails to appear and is never caught will
never face the incarceration he would likely be sentenced to if convicted.
Though he may pay an additional penalty for failing to appear if he is caught
and brought to justice, that cost (discounted by the probability it will be
imposed) might not be enough to deter efforts to escape justice. Intuition
and anecdote tell us that, for many people, not showing up could be a ra-
tional response to a serious charge. The societal consequences of a violent
suspect’s decision not to appear may be greater than for other felons, too.
Not only will the public interest in adjudicating his crime never be vindi-
cated, but he may also commit other crimes that would have been prevented
by his conviction and imprisonment.
Relatedly, though we worry that any suspect might commit a new crime
if he is not arrested, we worry more that a person accused of a violent crime
will hurt someone if he remains free before his first court appearance. This
view appears so widely held that the Supreme Court quietly embedded it in
the law, and almost no one has challenged it since. In Tennessee v. Garner,
the Court considered when deadly force can be used to stop a suspected
felon fleeing arrest.209 It concluded that deadly force is constitutionally per-
missible only “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the sus-
pect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others.”210 How do we know when a suspect poses such a threat? The Court
noted two possibilities. A suspect is sufficiently dangerous if he either
“threatens the officer with a weapon” during the escape, or if “there is prob-
able cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction
or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”211 For the Supreme Court,
suspicion that one has threatened violence in the past is sufficiently predic-
tive of future danger to justify not only arrest, but shooting the suspect in
the back of the head in order to prevent his escape.212  Simply put, the Court
shares the commonly held belief that people suspected of violent felonies are
dangerous.
The Supreme Court does not explain its calculus for concluding that
those accused of violent crimes pose a substantial ongoing risk of violence.
Without more evidence, it is not obvious that mere suspicion of one crime
predicts a high risk of new violent criminal activity in the short period be-
tween when the suspect is charged and his first date in court. One could take
the view that the public should not have to accept even a low risk of future
209. 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
210. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 11–12 (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitution-
ally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”).
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violence, and that our shared sense of unease is sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the presence of enough risk. But if this logic justifies our existing prac-
tice of arresting defendants accused of violent crimes, it does so only at the
price of raising considerable questions about our much more sophisticated
system of pretrial release.
Arrest and pretrial detention are motivated by many of the same con-
cerns. Like those just charged with a crime, suspects who are released pend-
ing trial may fail to appear or may commit crimes in the interim. Since the
first bail-reform movement of the early 1960s, however, policymakers and
commentators have viewed pretrial detention as a substantial intrusion on
individual interests.213 Over time, the law of pretrial detention has evolved to
permit consideration of future dangerousness and yet still maintain a pre-
sumption against holding suspects.214 Policymakers have sought ways to im-
pose detention only on suspects who pose the highest level of risk, and they
develop and use evidence-based measures to distinguish those suspects from
others.215 The idea is that, while pretrial detention may sometimes be neces-
sary to protect the public,216 it should only be imposed when we have good
reason to believe it really is needed. While many jurisdictions continue to
allow judges to make subjective pretrial release decisions, the clear trend is to
base the decision on research-refined, objective, risk-assessment instruments
that help judges identify the riskiest preconviction defendants.
There are methodological challenges to refining pretrial risk assessment
and political challenges to implementing it more widely.217 But the contrast
213. For an early example, see Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An
Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 67, 69 (1963) (“Americans take
seriously the presumption of innocence . . . . At the pre-trial stage the presumption means that
the defendant should ordinarily be given his freedom.”). For a more modern example, see
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale L.J. 1344, 1354
(2014) (“Being jailed . . . increase[s] the likelihood that the detainee will be convicted, impris-
oned, and subjected to prolonged deprivation of liberty, privacy, and other fundamental ele-
ments of human existence.”).
214. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
215. See Charles Summers & Tim Willis, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Pretrial Risk Assessment: Research Summary 3 (2010), https://www.bja.gov/
Publications/PretrialRiskAssessmentResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W9E-W486];
Marie VanNostrand & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Laura and John Arnold Found.,
Assessing Pretrial Risk Without a Defendant Interview 17 (2013), http://
www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_no-interview_FNL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9N2-3HPP]; Marie VanNostrand & Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk
Assessment in Virginia 4 (2009), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/
publications/corrections/virginia-pretrial-risk-assessment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAE7-
YVV3].
216. Summers & Willis, supra note 215, at 2.
217. See Cynthia A. Mamalian, Pretrial Justice Institute, State of the Science of
Pretrial Risk Assessment 26 (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/
PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20(2011).pdf
[https://perma.cc/MN8R-87QA] (summarizing the methodological challenges to creating an
effective risk-assessment tool).
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between existing pretrial detention decisions and prearraignment arrest de-
cisions is stark. For pretrial detention, jurisdictions use actuarial procedures
to determine who should be held for trial, and they support ongoing re-
search with the aim of releasing more suspects.218 For arrest, the decision to
impose coercive measures is simply the default, especially for those sus-
pected of serious crimes.
One could counter that pretrial release decisions are made in an institu-
tional environment much more conducive to assessing risk accurately than
the environment in which arrests for violent crimes are made. Pretrial re-
lease decisions happen in court at a bail hearing with input from pretrial
agencies, prosecutors, defendants, and—when they are present—defense
lawyers. The decision to arrest is sometimes made in similar circumstances:
judges decide whether to issue a summons rather than an arrest warrant
post-indictment after input from the prosecutor, for example. But more
often, it is made by police officers in the field in what the Supreme Court
would remind us are rapidly evolving circumstances.219 Nevertheless, al-
though there are irreducible differences between a bail hearing and a field
arrest, risk assessment is not as impossible in the latter case as one might
think.
First, police officers have the power to improve the conditions in which
the decision to arrest is made. Just as an officer may hold a suspect during a
traffic stop to check his driver’s license, determine whether he has outstand-
ing warrants, and inspect the car’s registration and proof of insurance before
issuing a ticket or warning,220 he may similarly detain a suspect whom he is
citing or arresting to check his prior criminal history and record of failing to
appear. This brief detention slows the decision down and allows an officer to
gather information. Unlike an officer facing a decision to use force, an of-
ficer deciding whether to arrest need not respond instantaneously with only
what he knows when he confronts the suspect.
Second, police officers have (or likely could have) all the information
they need to make an evidenced-based determination about whether an ar-
rest is necessary for a completed crime.221 Many of the validated risk factors
used by judges to assess a defendant’s risk level at a bail hearing are also
available to police officers in the field. The six most commonly used are (1)
whether the defendant has prior failures to appear; (2) whether he has prior
convictions (of various types); (3) whether the present charge is a felony; (4)
218. See Summers & Willis, supra note 215, at 3 (noting that the use of actuarial pretrial
risk-assessment instruments may improve outcomes in pretrial services); VanNostrand &
Lowenkamp, supra note 215, at 17 (finding that a noninterview, actuarial, risk assessment can
accurately predict failure-to-appear rates); VanNostrand & Rose, supra note 215, at 4 (dis-
cussing pretrial risk assessment in Virginia and finding that new actuarial pretrial tools led to
more effective release decisions).
219. E.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
220. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1611 (2015).
221. If an officer stops an offender during the act, the decision to arrest might involve an
additional consideration: whether the person would continue criminal activity in the absence
of an arrest.
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whether he is unemployed; (5) whether he has a history of drug abuse; and
(6) whether he has a pending case against him.222 Even assuming that a po-
lice officer does nothing to assess whether the suspect is a drug abuser or
employed—such as asking him—the other factors are available to most of-
ficers via radio or computer.223
In fact, with a risk-assessment tool, patrol officers may be able to make
arrest decisions in the field as well as judges make release decisions in court.
The most recent research on multi-jurisdiction risk-assessment instruments
for pretrial release indicates that the instruments are just as strong if they
exclude factors that can only be gained through an interview with a defen-
dant, such as his employment, residence, or drug history.224 This research
finds that the most relevant information for predicting failure to appear or
new criminal activity before trial is a suspect’s prior failures to appear and
prior convictions.225 Both facts are or can be available to an officer in the
field.226 Assuming that similar factors predict failures to appear and new
criminal activity before trial and before arraignment, police officers could
engage in evidence-based risk assessment using validated instruments before
determining whether to arrest.
What might a risk-assessment tool for the decision to arrest look like?
Research would be used to identify objective factors that help predict
whether a suspect is likely to reoffend or fail to appear if cited rather than
arrested, such as the nature of the crime at issue, and the suspect’s prior
history of failing to appear. Once those factors are identified, the tool could
be a simple paper form, a computer program, or a phone app that allowed
the officer to input information related to those factors. The tool could then
either guide the officer’s arrest decision, by labeling a suspect high, medium,
or low risk, as some pretrial release tools do, or perhaps more helpfully, it
could be definitive, spitting out a directive to arrest or not to arrest.
To be sure, this is nothing like the way decisions to arrest or cite are
presently made. First, the law does not allow evidence-based decisions about
arrest for many crimes and discourages it for others. Citations are over-
whelmingly forbidden by state law for all felonies and many misdemean-
ors.227 Even within permissible crime categories, and even when statutes
seem to encourage citations, law and policy prohibit citations for many,
sometimes problematic, reasons.228 For example, citations are generally for-
bidden whenever an officer has “reason to believe” a person will not appear
222. Mamalian, supra note 217, at 9.
223. See IACP, supra note 131, at 12–13 (finding that most officers have access in the field
to arrest history, warrant history, conviction history, and failure to appear history).
224. See VanNostrand & Lowenkamp, supra note 215, at 13.
225. Id. at 3.
226. See IACP, supra note 131, at 12–13.
227. See id. at 10–12.
228. See IACP, Literature Review, supra note 133, at 11, and Amber Widgery, Citation
in Lieu of Arrest, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/civil-and-criminal-ustice/citation-in-lieu-of-arrest.aspx [https://perma.cc/D74S-97
WP], for instances where citations might be prohibited.
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in court or poses a danger.229 No guidance is given about what objective
circumstances would constitute such a reason. Thus, officers are left to their
own intuitions about what facts predict non-appearance or dangerousness,
though they have no special knowledge and little opportunity to correct
their intuitions over time. Citations are also often forbidden if the suspect
has an outstanding warrant.230 Yet, in many communities, warrants are is-
sued so frequently and for such minor offenses that this restriction will
cause many low-level and low-risk offenders to be arrested.231 And some
existing restrictions on citations may be, on further analysis, unrelated to
risk, such as the common prohibition against issuing a citation if a suspect is
under the influence of alcohol or drugs.232
Second, even when there is no prohibition on issuing a citation, police
officers are rarely required to cite rather than arrest, even when the risks of
release are low. Except in some states for some low-level misdemeanors and
traffic violations, the decision to cite is left almost entirely to the discretion
of the individual officer.233 That means that for most offenses, police discre-
tion is limited in only one direction, against citation and in favor of arrest.
The rest of the time, police officers (within department policy) may do as
they will, which can lead to arrests for reasons unrelated to the public inter-
est, such as the suspect’s demeanor towards the officer,234 or whether an
officer wants overtime pay.235 Perhaps as a result, arrest decisions sometimes
seem arbitrary—even vindictive—and that is a considerable source of citi-
zen frustration with the police.236 Over time, risk-assessment tools could not
only reduce arrests, they could mitigate some of the drawbacks of discretion-
ary arrest decisions and perhaps the perceived injustice of existing practices.
Police might be reluctant to give up what has long been viewed as a core
part of their discretion. Some judges probably resist constraints on their
pretrial release decisions too. But arguments in favor of the discretion to
229. Widgery, supra note 228.
230. Id.
231. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 168, at tbl. 5a (showing over 7.8 mil-
lion outstanding warrants in state and federal databases, the vast majority of which are for
misdemeanors); Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Justice, supra note 168 (finding that in 2014,
16,000 people out of a population of 21,000 had outstanding warrants in Ferguson, Missouri,
most of which were for traffic violations or ordinance infractions).
232. IACP, Literature Review, supra note 133, at 11 (quoting Widgery, supra note 228).
233. Id. at 12.
234. See, e.g., Robin Shepard Engel et al., Further Exploration of the Demeanor Hypothesis:
The Interaction Effects of Suspects’ Characteristics and Demeanor on Police Behavior, 17 Just. Q.
235, 256 (2000).
235. See Edith Linn, Arrest Decisions: What Works for the Officer? 86–89 (2009).
236. Consider the reaction to Sandra Bland’s recent arrest in Texas. Sandra Bland was
pulled over for failing to signal, then arrested for failing to exit her car after she challenged the
officer’s authority. She was found dead in jail a few days later in what was ultimately deemed a
suicide. Outraged commentators highlighted how ill-motivated and gratuitous the arrest
seemed. See David A. Graham, How Many Sandra Blands Are Out There?, Atlantic (July 22,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/07/how-many-sandra-blands-are-
never-caught-on-video/399173/ [https://perma.cc/B9LT-UKXV].
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arrest depend on the idea that refined, situational analysis by officers best
serves the public interest, because it most effectively identifies those suspects
who should be arrested.237 If more people can, through a less discretionary
process, be released with only a low increase in failures to appear and reof-
fending, then broad discretion to arrest is no longer justified.
Of course, risk assessment will not necessarily lead to fewer arrests for
defendants charged with violent crimes. If the nature of the charged crime
predicts failure to appear or new criminal activity, continuing to arrest vio-
lent criminals may be justified. But if we actually engage in research to con-
struct and validate risk-assessment instruments for the decision to arrest, we
might be surprised by what we find. Validated risk-assessment tools for pre-
trial release all use the charged crime as a risk factor in predicting failures to
appear and commissions of a new crime during release.238 But it is only one
among many factors, and it is not heavily weighted in sorting defendants by
risk.239
Existing instruments for pretrial release show that even defendants who
would be assigned the highest risk classifications actually fail to appear or
get arrested for any new crime less than a quarter of the time.240 Those de-
fendants have months to flee or to get into new trouble.241 By contrast, de-
fendants who are charged but not arrested will usually have far less time to
disappear or commit a crime before they are scheduled to appear in court.
Their failure rate may be lower, which might justify narrowing the highest-
risk category and permitting more of them to avoid arrest. If we evaluate the
237. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 651 (1997) (“[C]lose, local
examination by police of a neighborhood’s problems, the devotion to ameliorating those
problems in consultation with a neighborhood’s residents, and the sparing use of public order
laws for the specific purpose of strengthening the social fabric of a community, may offer a
better alternative than what in many places has gone before.”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M.
Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998
U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 209–11 (arguing that “guided discretion” allows officers to incorporate
community context and input into arrest and enforcement decisions).
238. See VanNostrand & Lowenkamp, supra note 215, at 5.
239. Id. The Kentucky Pretrial Risk Assessment, for example, assigns 1 point out of 24
points to a defendant if the present charge is a Class A, B, or C felony. Id. at 10. A defendant is
labelled high risk if he scores 14–24 points. Id. at 11. The revised validated Virginia Pretrial
Release Assessment Instrument assigns 1 out of 9 points to a defendant if the present charge is
a felony rather than a misdemeanor. See VanNostrand & Rose, supra note 215, at 13, 18. A
defendant is classified high risk if he scores 5–9. Id. at 13.
240. See Mamalian, supra note 217, at 15 (noting that high risk defendants were found to
have failure to appear rates under 25%); Qudsia Siddiqi, New York City Criminal Justice
Agency, Predicting the Likelihood of Pretrial Re-arrest for Violent Felony Of-
fenses and Examining the Risk of Pretrial Failure Among New York City Defend-
ants: An Analysis of the 2001 Dataset (2006) (finding a failure to appear rate of 24% for
high-risk defendants); Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the
Federal Court, 72 Fed. Prob. 13 (2009) (finding a combined failure to appear and re-arrest rate
for high risk defendants of 15.5 percent).
241. See Mamalian, supra note 217, at 29 (noting average length of time between release
and trial is measured in days or months depending on jurisdiction).
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decision to arrest based on evidence rather than intuition, we might well
find that choosing not to arrest a suspect—even one charged with a violent
crime—is far less risky than we imagine. We generally have accepted preven-
tive arrests as easily justified because we think that the cost of arrest is small
and the threat the suspects pose is significant. In Part I, I argued the first
claim is not true. The argument here suggests that perhaps the second one is
not either.
One might respond that even if arresting someone charged with rape or
armed robbery is unnecessary to adjudicate their crime, it is useful as a way
to condemn the criminal. Our strong reasons to condemn felony conduct do
not change one underlying problem with using arrests this way: probable
cause is no more a basis for justifying condemnation of an individual for
committing a felony than it is for a misdemeanor. In fact, using felony ar-
rests this way may be more problematic because felony arrests are frequently
based on weaker and more circumstantial evidence than arrests for
misdemeanors.242
Still, even if arrest is inappropriate to communicate societal disapproba-
tion of an individual, it might convey the seriousness with which society
condemns the crime, a matter closely connected to respect for the victim.
Thus, for example, advocates have suggested that we should arrest (even
misdemeanor) domestic violence suspects because of the symbolic value of
these arrests.243 Usually, however, these arguments assume that arrests are
also justified for other, more pragmatic, reasons. In the absence of another
justification for the arrest, it seems normatively problematic to use this fun-
damentally instrumental tool for its expressive value, especially when we
have other methods—namely, convicting a criminal in open court, labelling
him a felon, and sentencing him to a substantial term of imprisonment—to
serve that end.
Comparing our existing arrest practice to our system of pretrial release
shows how bizarre it is that we take for granted the necessity of so many
arrests. Most felony defendants are released until trial, and 90 percent of
242. For felonies, police officers in some jurisdictions can rely on secondhand and cir-
cumstantial evidence to form probable cause for a warrantless arrest, whereas for misdemean-
ors in those same jurisdictions, officers must see the crime to make a warrantless arrest. See,
e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 15 (Supp. 2015). This suggests, given that arrests are
mostly warrantless, that on average one can expect that felony arrests are based on less and less
direct evidence than misdemeanor arrests.
243. See Kristin A. Kelly, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Privacy 89–90
(2003) (discussing the symbolic value of domestic violence arrests to victims and those in-
volved in domestic violence work); id. at 90 (noting that interviews “reflect[ed] a persistent
and consistent presentation of the law as a key mechanism for bringing public commitment
and values to bear in cases of domestic violence”); Rana Sampson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 45, Domes-
tic Violence (2007), http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/domestic_violence.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/8XCM-CHYZ] (“For many advocates, batterer arrest is seen as an important symbol
of a woman’s legal right to be free of intimate partner violence . . . .”).
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those detained are held only because they do not have the money for bail.244
By contrast, almost all suspected felons are arrested. Why arrest so many
defendants on day one because they are too risky to release when we know
that on day three or day ten they will likely be offered terms that permit
them to go free, at least if they have some resources?245 Similarly, pretrial
release decisions are made after an adversarial hearing in court, based on
clear and often objective, evidence-based criteria. The decisions can be revis-
ited in short order, and they can be appealed. Despite these procedural pro-
tections, we favor release over detention.246 By contrast, arrest decisions are
often made in the field. The decision to arrest rather than cite is usually
uncontestable, irreversible, and unreviewable. Yet, in this context, we favor
detention. There are times that the law permits people to be held in custody
without much process because they pose a safety threat—during times of
insurrection, for instance247—but, if anything, those circumstances suggest
how extraordinary it is that, even for violent crimes, the decision to arrest
has escaped scrutiny.
D. Arrests to Gather Evidence
I have focused on arrests used to start criminal adjudication, to main-
tain order, or to protect public safety. There is, however, one additional
argument that is sometimes used to defend arrests on pragmatic grounds
that might require more analysis: evidence collection.248
Police gather information from suspects after they are arrested, and they
sometimes conduct arrests so that they may do so.249 When an officer arrests
244. See Timothy R. Schnacke, Nat’l Inst. of Corr., Fundamentals of Bail: A Re-
source Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial
Reform 12 (2014), http://clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_
8,_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB7S-WWUP].
245. One might contend that some of those released pretrial pay bail or bonds which
might give them additional incentive to appear while arrestees do not, but many of those
released pretrial are released on their own recognizance or on an unsecured bond. See Thomas
H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release of Felony
Defendants in State Courts 2 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BKQ-38Z8]; Reaves, supra note 152, at 38.
246. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
247. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding act allowing the President to
detain and remove alien enemies from the United States during times of war); Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (permitting governor to jail individual without probable cause
during an insurrection).
248. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173 (2008) (“Arrest ensures that a suspect
appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and
enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation.” (citing LaFave, supra note 128)).
249. See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (striking down Iowa law that
allowed a search of an automobile incident to a citation over State’s argument that “a suspect
who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence . . . of another,
as yet undetected crime”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754 (1969) (finding unlawful a
search incident to arrest consisting of entire three-bedroom house, including attic, garage,
small workshop, and contents of drawers as too extensive for a search incident to arrest).
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a suspect, the law permits a full search incident to arrest of the person and
the immediately grabbable area,250 a protective sweep of a house or car,251
and often an inventory search of a car or belongings.252 The government may
obtain fingerprints and DNA, and photograph scars, tattoos, and other
(sometimes) incriminating physical characteristics.253 The officer may ask
ordinary booking questions and, with Miranda warnings, may conduct
more extensive custodial interrogations.254 Together these forms of question-
ing provide not only information about specific crimes, but also provide
information about criminal associates and gang membership that are used
to understand criminal patterns and networks. Restricting arrests and re-
placing them with citations or summonses limits all of these forms of devel-
oping evidence.
Many of the arrest-conditional methods of gathering evidence have
non-arrest substitutes, including Terry stops and frisks,255 consent
searches,256 searches pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement,257 exigency searches,258 searches pursuant to a warrant, and
noncustodial interviews.259 But these substitutes are not perfect. They are
variously narrower in scope, more demanding of individualized suspicion,
and more costly to litigate than arrest-related, evidence-gathering tech-
niques. Reducing arrests may mean giving up some evidence for some
crimes.
This cost might not be trivial. Suspects and witnesses are often ar-
rested—sometimes for unrelated crimes—precisely so that the police can
question them.260 If the arrest does not happen, neither will the interroga-
tion. It is not enough to say that the suspect could be questioned at a differ-
ent time. Before the arrest, the arrestee can choose to walk away from the
police rather than talk. After the arrest culminates in an arraignment, he will
usually have a court-appointed lawyer, who will put a stop to further ques-
tioning. The practicalities of arrest in combination with criminal procedure
doctrine permit officers to generate a space in which suspects and witnesses
are isolated and unrepresented and therefore likely to cooperate, even if they
250. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
251. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
252. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370–72 (1987).
253. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
254. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (allowing routine booking ques-
tions to be asked as part of the booking process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(allowing interrogation following a custodial arrest so long as warnings are given).
255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
257. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
258. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
259. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
260. See generally Kit Kinports, Camreta and Al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, the Fourth
Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283 (2012) (noting that individu-
als have often been seized as witnesses or for interrogation).
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resisted talking on the street. If losing these statements means losing some
convictions or reducing some sentences, and convictions and sentences deter
crime and provide retributive justice, then not arresting these suspects could
mean a less effective criminal justice system.261
Given how historically resilient criminal prosecutions have been in the
face of procedural restraint,262 it seems unlikely that crime would run ram-
pant because of lost evidence from non-arrests. Still, if those custodial inter-
rogations prove essential to the criminal process, we should ask whether
arrests are necessary to facilitate them. The key aspects of arrest for this
purpose are the uncounseled interview and the threat of criminal charges.
We have already seen that criminal charges are not dependent on arrest. If
we truly believe that brief, uncounseled interviews are necessary to solve
crimes, perhaps we should permit them. If doing so is inconsistent with
other criminal justice values, then we might not want to permit arrests in
order to create a workaround. In any case, given the costs generated by other
aspects of arrests—for example, the criminal record—arrests seem unneces-
sarily broad for the job. Simply put, we can forgo the evidence; allow arrests;
allow interrogations without arrests; or invest in alternative evidence-gather-
ing methods. I do not assume arrests are the right answer.
E. Arrests to Deter
I have argued that the most common justifications for arrests—that the
arrests are necessary to start the criminal process, stop disorder, and gather
evidence—are unpersuasive in light of available alternatives. It could be that,
whether or not any specific arrest is necessary to achieve a law enforcement
function, arrests have benefits more generally because they allow police to
deter crime. If arrests deter crime, then decreasing arrests could increase
crime, an important consideration in deciding what to do about the harms
of arrests. As it turns out, however, contemporary criminological research
strongly suggests that police do not deter crime best by arresting
criminals.263
261. Of course, if many of the statements secured during post-arrest interrogations are
false, the system might be instead a more accurate one.
262. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 585 (finding based on a study of 7,500 cases that the exclu-
sionary rule exacted minimal social cost with suppression occurring in only 0.69 percent of
cases); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1996) (finding that Miranda’s net impact on con-
viction rates was near zero). But see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387, 437–40 (1996) (finding a loss of conviction in 3.8 per-
cent of serious criminal cases as a result of Miranda).
263. See Cynthia Lum & Daniel S. Nagin, Reinventing American Policing: A Seven-Point
Blueprint for the 21st Century 9–12 (Feb. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Michigan Law Review).
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In recent years, several policing strategies have been shown to reduce
crime effectively, including mostly notably, hot spots policing, problem-ori-
ented policing, and focused deterrence strategies.264 None of them is arrest-
intensive. By contrast, arrest-intensive policing strategies, including tradi-
tional patrol and arrest strategies, zero-tolerance policing, and some versions
of broken-windows policing, have much less evidence to support their effec-
tiveness.265 It seems that police can deter without making many arrests.
How do police deter if not by arresting criminals? Using both theory
and empirical evidence, Daniel Nagin, a prominent criminologist, has ar-
gued that police deter crime more by persuading would-be offenders that
they will not succeed than by arresting some criminals to make others afraid
of future arrest. That is to say, police deter as “sentinels,” not as “apprehen-
sion agents.”266 Of course, the relationship between how police guard against
crime and their use of arrests is complicated: if they never arrested anyone, it
is hard to see how officers would persuade offenders that they would not
succeed.267 Still, “[t]he bottom line on the effectiveness of policing tactics
that emphasize arrest for misdemeanors . . . is that they don’t appear to be as
effective as tactics designed to enhance guardianship or mitigate opportuni-
ties without arrest.”268 It is fair to say that police do not need to make a lot of
arrests to stop a lot of crime. Given how many good reasons there are to
reduce arrests, this should reassure us that there are few good reasons not to
do so.
Conclusion: What to Do About Arrests
Right now, arrests are deeply embedded in our system of criminal jus-
tice. They are central to what it means to be a police officer and central to
our ways of thinking about stopping crime. Departments encourage arrests
264. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 9–12); Anthony A. Braga et al., Can Policing Disorder
Reduce Crime? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 52 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 567,
580–81 (2015) [hereinafter Braga et al., Policing Disorder]; Anthony Braga et al., Hot Spots
Policing Effects on Crime, Campbell Systematic Revs., June 27, 2012, at 20–21; Anthony A.
Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial,
46 Criminology 577, 597–600 (2008) (concluding that prevention strategies rather than mis-
demeanor arrests produced the greatest crime-prevention gains); Anthony A. Braga & David L.
Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 323, 348–49 (2012); Weisburd
et al., supra note 184, at 153.
265. See Braga et al., Policing Disorder, supra note 264, at 568–69; Bernard E. Harcourt &
Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experi-
ment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271, 272 (2006); David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do
to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci., May 2004, at 42,
58–60; Lum & Nagin, supra note 263 (manuscript at 15–17).
266. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and Police, 53 Crimi-
nology 74, 78–79 (2015); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 Crime &
Just. 199, 237–40 (2013).
267. See Nagin, supra note 266, at 202–03.
268. Lum & Nagin, supra note 263 (manuscript at 17). Criminological research takes fel-
ony arrests for granted because they are now nondiscretionary. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 7).
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through broken-windows or zero-tolerance policing philosophies,269 and use
arrest numbers as a measure of productivity and a basis for overtime pay.270
Yet our arrest practice appears largely unjustified. We conduct a vast number
of harmful arrests, even though arrest is often unnecessary to achieve our
law enforcement goals, and even though we have not yet seriously explored
the range of possible alternatives. Nevertheless, while other criminal justice
practices are subject to intense scrutiny and proposals for profound reform,
arrests are left largely intact, if they are considered at all.
Take, for example, the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing.271 In its nearly one hundred pages, it barely mentions ar-
rests. When it does, its proposals could hardly be meeker. Action Item 2.2.1,
states that “[l]aw enforcement agency policies for training on use of force
should emphasize de-escalation and alternatives to arrest or summons in
situations where appropriate.”272 Recommendation 2.9 states that “[l]aw en-
forcement agencies and municipalities should refrain from practices requir-
ing officers to issue a predetermined number of tickets, citations, arrests, or
summonses . . . .”273 And Action Item 4.1.1 states that, “[l]aw enforcement
agencies should consider adopting preferences for seeking ‘least harm’ reso-
lutions, such as diversion programs or warnings and citations in lieu of ar-
rest for minor infractions.”274
Each of the President’s Task Force suggestions is consistent with the ar-
guments of this Article. The first recognizes that arrests and the use of force
are inextricably linked. The second rejects arrest quotas as a productivity
tool in policing. And the third acknowledges that arrests impose especially
unjustifiable harm when they are used for noncriminal violations. But these
recommendations would not significantly alter any aspect of contemporary
arrest practice, and they keep responsibility for arrest decisions entirely in
the hands of law enforcement agencies, which in turn tend to leave much of
that discretion in the hands of individual officers.
The same is true of recent proposals seeking to reduce the impact of
coercive policing by giving the police a wider range of options for managing
disorder. For example, Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott recently advocated
269. See, e.g., George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Why We Need Broken Windows
Policing, City J. (Winter 2015), http://www.city-journal.org/html/why-we-need-broken-win-
dows-policing-13696.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2G-R7H5] (writing as founder and leading
practitioner of broken windows policing and justifying increased misdemeanor arrests as part
of broken windows strategy).
270. See Linn, supra note 235, at 48–49 (finding New York City police officers on average
made 25.1 percent of arrests in the last hour of their shift as a means of getting overtime pay);
id. at 104 (finding that a desire for promotion was a motivating factor for some arrests);
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
453, 498–99 (2004) (arguing that departmental rewards for arrests in the form of promotions
or commendations lead to more arrests than legally justified).
271. Final Report of the President’s Task Force, supra note 186.
272. Id. at 20.
273. Id. at 26.
274. Id. at 43.
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passing civil ordinances permitting police to detain individuals for up to
twenty-four hours without generating arrest records.275 This additive ap-
proach to reducing arrests is favored by police chiefs, who in the words of
then New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton “seek to expand
the officer’s toolbox rather than to contract it, so that Department policy
can provide guidance to officers based on a wider range of enforcement
options, as circumstances warrant.”276 But like the value of the Task Force’s
proposals, the value of any such new tools depends on the interests and
incentives of the officers and officials who choose whether to use them.
Clearly, police departments could, starting any time, conduct far fewer
arrests than they currently do. They should, and some have. The New York
Police Department, for instance, announced in March 2016 that it “will no
longer arrest individuals who commit [minor] offenses – such as littering,
public consumption of alcohol, or taking up two seats on the subway –
unless there is a demonstrated public safety reason to do so.”277 Instead, it
intends to issue summonses for these offenses.278
The New York innovation has not been articulated in law, or even ap-
parently in written policy, at least not yet.279  Even if it were, we cannot
expect individual officers, police chiefs, and departments to balance ade-
quately the interests of individuals and society in formulating arrest prac-
tices or to retain a commitment to doing so over time. Police departments
receive frequent demands from members of the public to immediately solve
problems on the street.  Communities may sometimes effectively press de-
partments to engage in less intrusive policing, as happened in New York, but
usually only when harms are especially apparent and salient, something that
is rarely true for arrests.280 Some exceptions aside, police chiefs are usually
rewarded more for visibly promoting public safety than they are penalized
275. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
F. 268, 283–88 (2015). Although Gerstein and Prescott approach the question of why police
need to make arrests, they do not answer the question other than to say that the police are
likely to continue to arrest people even if criminal public order offenses were removed from
the statute books. See id. at 279–83. Their answer takes for granted that there is no way to
restrict arrests for misdemeanor violations other than to eliminate the criminal violations
themselves.
276. Letter from William J. Bratton, Police Commissioner, City of New York, to Melissa
Mark-Viverito, Speaker, New York City Council (May 4, 2015) (on file with Michigan Law
Review).
277. Press Release, The New York Cty. Dist. Att’ys Office, District Attorney Vance, Com-
missioner Bratton, Mayor De Blasio Announce New Structural Changes to Criminal Sum-
monses Issued in Manhattan (Mar. 1, 2016), http://manhattanda.org/press-release/district-
attorney-vance-commissioner-bratton-mayor-de-blasio-announce-new-structural-c [https://
perma.cc/23CG-XXAH].
278. Id.
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for imposing unnecessary coercion.281 Moreover, public pressure to reduce
arrests can be hard to sustain.  Given competing demands, even a police
department that states an intent to reduce arrests may find it difficult to do
so, especially over time.282
Other recent reform ideas might have some impact. Many have sug-
gested decriminalizing some misdemeanors, which could—at least in the-
ory—reduce the number of arrests conducted for the least serious crimes,
though substitute grounds for arrest are often plentiful.283 Others have sug-
gested ways to limit some of the harms of arrests by restricting the conse-
quences for employment, public housing, and immigration status, or by
forbidding the use of force to subdue some suspects.284 Though these re-
forms might have benefits, I suspect that far more fundamental changes are
necessary, changes that unsettle the assumption that police should have such
broad discretion to arrest. Tinkering at the edges of arrests may not be suffi-
cient to disrupt their elevated, nearly sacrosanct, status as a law enforcement
tool, or to bring our existing practice of arrests in line with our best reasons
for using them.
More meaningful change likely requires state law reform. States could
expand the authority to issue summonses and citations where it is lacking,
and they could limit statutory authority to arrest when it is least needed.
They could impose evidence-based criteria on officers’ decisions to arrest
when arrests might be appropriate, and they could establish external mecha-
nisms for reviewing those decisions. Federal law is less important, but it
281. For example, police chiefs often do not effectively internalize the costs of monetary
judgments from damages actions, the most common direct repercussion for incidents of ex-
cessive force. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 270, at 475 (arguing that chiefs of police may
tolerate police brutality because the political gains of aggressive policing outweigh the financial
costs of liability); Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 33 (2012); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000); Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144
(2016).
282. Cf. First Report of the Monitor at 17–18, 59–60, Floyd v. City of New York, 302
F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 08-CV-1034) (finding that following NYPD policy changes to
stop and frisk policy, officers are failing to document some stops and frisks and reasoning that
this may partially explain lower stop and frisk numbers).
283. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal
Law 17–32 (2008) (discussing overcriminalization, the important constraints on criminal
sanction, and the great injustice of overpunishment). But see Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheer-
ing Stopped: Decriminalization and Legalism’s Limits, 24 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol. 319 (2014)
(arguing that decriminalization has not reduced the number of arrests because of department
incentives to arrest); Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traf-
fic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672 (2015) (arguing that decriminalization alone cannot reduce the
number of arrests without limits on police discretion).
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Police Force Starts with New Rules of Engagement, Wash. Post (Dec. 25, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ending-excessive-police-force-starts-with-new-rules-of-
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could also encourage better arrest policies and practices. At the very least,
the federal government could reconsider its policy of actively incentivizing
arrests through federal grant programs.285
Most such reforms require more analysis to determine how best to im-
plement them, and all of them would meet substantial resistance. Moreover,
any efforts to reduce arrests would create new risks. One I have already men-
tioned is that field detentions to reduce arrests could backfire by allowing
the police to impose harm on more suspects. This example should remind
us that alternatives to arrests impose harm as well. As the Justice Depart-
ment’s investigation into unconstitutional law enforcement practices in Fer-
guson, Missouri forcefully reminds us, tickets, fines, fees, and outstanding
warrants for failure to appear can be as effective as arrests and convictions at
reinforcing inequality and holding people down.286 If fines are imposed
blithely and bench warrants issued too easily for failures to appear, suspects
suffer. This is especially true for the poor, who find it harder to pay those
fines or get to court. If arrest-reduction policies are implemented in a way
that substantially expands these practices or other costs, then—in the aggre-
gate—reform might do more harm than good.
A second risk is that, even if we reduce arrests without increasing harm
overall, reducing arrests could still exacerbate existing inequalities in the dis-
tribution of criminal justice harms. For instance, if we reduce arrests for
those who have identification, or those who can convince an officer that
they will show up pursuant to a summons, then we may disproportionately
reduce arrests for the rich and white, and in the process make the conse-
quences of arrests to others even more invisible outside of heavily affected
communities. Since arrest practices must, to be justifiable, be distribution-
ally fair as well as proportional to the harm they impose, this kind of effect
could worsen one problem with arrests in an effort to mitigate another.
Third, some costs of arrests may be more persistent than the arrests
themselves. If fewer suspects are arrested, perhaps employers will ask about
citations and tickets instead. If more citations are issued, perhaps those cita-
tions will become the new locus for confrontations between suspects and the
police. If technology permits collecting evidence and information during the
citation process, suspects will experience no privacy gains from restricting
arrests. If many of the harms of arrests persist in such ways, limiting arrests
may do less good than we imagine.
These risks suggest that we should take care in how we restrict arrests,
not that we should avoid the project. For example, it cannot possibly be that
the best way to avoid overloading people with fines they cannot pay and
issuing warrants to arrest them is to arrest them in the first instance instead.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh (2013) (authorizing grants for arrests under Violence Against
Women Act); Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 1, at 913–14; see also Cassandra Archer
et al., Inst. for L. & Just., National Evaluation of the Grants to Encourage Arrest
Policies Program 1–6 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199441.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V5DM-R8E7] (discussing origins, purposes, and effects of the Arrest Program).
286. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., supra note 168, at 3.
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In Ferguson, the Justice Department has suggested that this problem can be
mitigated by improving municipal court practices, tailoring fines to ability
to pay, and instituting community service alternatives to fines and fees, all of
which reduce the consequences for failing to pay for tickets or appear in
court. New York’s new robocalls and flexible court dates could minimize
nonappearance before it occurs. Experience will likely lead to additional
strategies for minimizing the tradeoffs that come from embracing alterna-
tives to arrests.
If you think substantially reducing or eliminating arrests sounds impos-
sible, consider that the civil process made this very transition. By the end of
the sixteenth century, at common law most civil defendants were arrested to
start civil court proceedings.287 Though the practice lasted for centuries, over
time “[t]he harshness of arresting a defendant on trumped-up charges and
forcing him to raise bail, especially in small cases, brought about the devel-
opment of procedures which helped to mitigate the rigors of the arrest sys-
tem.”288 Those reforms included alternatives to arrest and default
judgments.289 Now, of course, arrests to start civil suits are both unheard of
and unnecessary.290 Yet, somehow, civil legal actions manage to continue.
Though it has not been high on the agenda of criminal justice reformers
in recent years, arrest reform seems more possible than it has in decades, in
significant part because crime rates are low. Policymakers care about pro-
moting cost-efficient and evidence-based criminal justice solutions. There is
a new national dialogue about the problems of policing and increased so-
phistication about what it means to strengthen law enforcement. And
through videos, the risks of violent confrontations during arrests are more
visible than ever. Given that arrests are far more problematic and perhaps
far less necessary than we have previously acknowledged, now is the moment
to reconsider arrests rather than continue to take this widespread form of
state coercion for granted.
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